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CHAPTER I
VALU~,

~he

.'

THE GREATEST PROBLEM OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

first question that the thinking man desires an-

swered about any subject which he may be inclined to investigate is whether his efforts are gOing to be worthwhile.

With

regard to the problem of value theory, Doctor Fulton Sheen
assures us that there is no danger of exaggerating the place
which it holds in the world today:

Wilbur M. Urban, an out-

standing non-Scholastic valuist, also remarks upon the shift
in modern metaphysics from the study of being to that of value~
Even more important, however, has been the shift from the the3

ory of knowledge to the theory of value.

"Value", which but

a few decades ago would have suggested nothing more than a
term in economics, is now perhaps the most essential feature
of non-Scholastic PhilOSOPhY~

~here is no field to which its

influence does not extend, and its effects have been every5

where tremendous.

But in no other instance has this influence been so
conspicuous as in the field of religion.

Here, as we shall

see in vhapter VII, its consequences have been of the highest
import and have affected the ethical beliefs of our age to
their deepest foundations.

rteligion for the modern theorist

is no longer the humble recognition and service of a

~upreme

Creator and Lawgiver Who mercifully provides for His creatures,

2

but is now "a faith in the conservation of values".

6

By

"faith", however, the modern philosophers do not intend'-the
theological virtue which is the foundation of all supernatural
religion, but rather a vague emotional confidence or sentimental opinion.

~his

modern attitude towards God is perhaps

the most cogent argument for studying the philosophy of value,
since it vitally affects t. most important concern of our
race.
OUr

purpose in this thesis is not to discuss all or

even many of the various levels in the scale of values, but
rather to confine our treatment to the analysis of the fundamental concept of value.

Moreover, it will be necessary to

limit our discussion to the leading British-and American exponents of the theory of value, since an attempt to include
a discussion of equivalent continental doctrines would make
our work too discursive.
will be as follows:

OUr

method of procedure, therefore,

first, to present in digest a non-com-

mittal exposition of the non-Scholastic theory; secondly, to
explain the Scholastic doctrine on value; thirdly, to criticize the scientific and metaphysical origins of non-Scholastic theory in the light of Thomistic principles; fourthly,
in the light of these same principles to point out certain
inconsistencies and fallacious conclusions of the non-Scholastic theory; and fifth)y, by applying the doctrine of nonScholastic philosophy to another science, namely that of re-

3

ligion# to show that its consequences are inacceptable and
contrar 7 to the evidence of objective realit7_

~

Last of all.

we shall offer some suggestions concerning the prospective
outcome of this all-important problem of value_

4
FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER I

.'

1.

F. J. Sheen, Religion Without .Q:2g, p. 60, sqq.

2.

W. M. Urban, "Value Theory and Esthetics", Philosophy
Today, p. 54

3.

J. E. Russell, "Truth as Value and the Value of Truth",

Mind, XXI (1912), pp. 538-539
R. W. Sellars, "Cognition and Valuation", Philosophical
Review, XXXV (1926), pp. 124-144
M. H. Moore, "Truth and the Interest Theory of Value",
Philosophical Review, XLV (1936), p. 171

4.

The term "value" has long been employed in economics in
several definite senses, as for instance, exchange
value, marginal value, price value, etc. For a complete discussion of the economic uses of the term, cf.
E. S. Burke, Political Economy, pp. 37-44.
The fundamental definition of economic value proposed
in these pages - namely, "the desirability of the
economic utility of an object" - is but a particular
application of the general idea of value that this thesis aims to defend.

5.

For the effect of subjective value theory on various
fields, ct.
on art: F. J. Sheen, Religion Without ~,
pp. 263-269 - impressionism and the
cult of the indistinct
on economics: L. R. Ward, Values ~ Reality,
Chapter XIII, "The Value of Money"
on psychology: R. B. Perry, General Theory 2!
Value - "interest" and motor-affective
states of being
on science: Cf. Footnote 2 to Chap. IV of this
thesis
---on sociology: R. W. Sellars, Principles and Prob.!!.!!!. 9.! Philosophy, pp. 383-490 ::-Society
as value

6.

A. Hoffding, Philosophy of neligion, p. 6, as quoted by
F. J. Sheen, Ril1S16n-With6Ut ~, p. 64
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CHAPTER II
DOCTRINES OF '1'HE LEADING BRITISH AND AMERICAN .'
NON-SCHOLASTIC VALUE THEORISTS

The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief, uncritical exposition of the doctrines of the leading British
and American non-Scholastic value theorists.

I say "uncrit-

ical", because we cannot properly evaluate the non-Scholastic theories, until we have discovered some sound norms of
criticism in the Scholastic position.

Perhaps, the order

which is used in arranging these modern theories, may be
regarded as a kind of criticism.

Without order, however, it

would be impossible to make any progress at all.

And in this

matter order is especially important, since the lack of it
is one of the chief difficulties of the non-Scholastic position today.

It is a lack so conspicuous that the analysis

of the value theory has justly been called a study in confusion.

For instance, many of the moderns do not distinguish

between value and values and talk of intermediate and secondary values as if these were fundamental.

Some of them even

go so far as to hold or seem to nold contradictory opinions,
which cannot be reconciled if taken literally.
Since we must find some basiS of division, the best
way of doing this seems to be to consider the facts of the
value situation and to draw up our categories according to

p-_ _----------------------------------------~I
6
them.

In the act of valuing, three elemental facts appear to

stand out most prominently - the subject who values,

t~

ject that is valued, and the relation between them.

Therefore,

ob-

classifying the modern non-Scholastics according to the element wherein they make value reside, we have:

the subjective

school, which places value primarily in the valuing subject;
the relational school, which places it in the relation between,
the. subject and its object; and the objective school, which
places it in the object itself.

This last group must be again

subdivided into those who mean objective in a sense akin to
that accepted by

~cholasticism

and those who either mean sub-

jective or say something that is altogether impeaaible.
A - Subjective School
1.

Ralph Barton PerrI
We shall take Dr. Perry as the first and chief repre-

sentative of the subjective school in America, since he haa
written so much on the subject of value theory and has enjoyed great influence

~ong

his fellow philosophers.

His

outstanding importance is also demonstrated by the fact that
it is his doctrine which is the main object of attack by the
leading English-speaking Gatholic philosophers in this field.
In his earlier days, Mr. Perry preferred ttdesire" as
the keystone to his theory of value, but about 1914 changed

JIII"""'

--------------------------------------------------------~7~1

over to "interest n as the central fact.l He tells us that the
first problem of value theory is to define the term "value",
which he does as follows:
"Value in the generic sense has to do with a certain constant which we may call ~ or interest .2 •••••• Value
consists in the fulfillment of interest."
It is worth noting that he here uses the words "has to do with
a certain constant".

These words as yet do not make clear

whether "bias or interest" is value or merely has to do with
value.

In the next sentence the verb t1consists" leaves fur-

ther room for doubt as to just what value really is.
But if his earlier definition of value was tantal1zingly vague, Mr. Perry twelve years later clarifies the issue
by taking the following definite stand:
"It is to this all-pervasive characteristic of the motoraffective life, this state, ~, attitude ~ disposition
of favor or disfavor, to which we propose to give the
name of interest. ThiS, then, we take to be tlB orig1.nal
source and constant feature of all value. That Which is
an object of interest is invested with value. Any object,
whatever it be, acquires value when any interest-; whatever it be, is taken in it ••••• In other words, Aristotle
was fundamentally mistaken when he said, that a thing1s
iapparent good f makes it an object of appetite, so its
real good makes it the object of 'rational desire l • By
the same token ~pinoza was ~damentally correct when he
said that iinno case do we strive for, wish for, long
for, or desire anything because we deem it to be good,
but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good because
we strive for it •••••••••• I • n3
In this quotation are contained the chief features
of Mr. Perry's doctrine:

its subjective and psychological

character, its emphasis on interest or motor-affective atti-

~~------------------------------~--~
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tude as the central fact of all value theory, and its disagreement with the Scholastic position on good.

Elsewhe~e

also

he insists in opposition to G. E. Moore that goodness is not
an indefinable quality independent of consciousness and explicitly states that there is nothing so precious that its
value would not disappear if all needs, likings, and aspirations were extinguishe~

Moreover, he objects to the old

narrow triumvirate of the Scholastics and wishes to substitute "an elastic polytheism for the conventional trinitarianism of the worshippers of the true, the beautiful, and the
good," yet, on the same page he tells us that "attitudes of
liking and disliking" is a sufficiently broad term to replace
the old categories. 5
In a remarkable part of the General
(pages 115-124), Mr.

~erry

~heorl ~

Value

seemB to take three different

stands on the location of value.

He states first, that value

is nany object of interest" or "that special characteristiC"
~f ~~e

object in which interest is taken; secondly, that value

is "the peculiar relation" between subject and object; and
thirdly, that valuing is value itself.

~assages

from these

pages could well classify him as subjective, relational, or
objective, but assuredly it is difficult to place him in all
three simultaneously, unless the term "value" is so broad in
his philosophy as to be of little use.

However, from the

passage previously quoted and from the further discussion of

~------------------------------~I
9

,

interest in Chapter VI, we see that Mr. Perry is derinitely
committed to the psychological and subjective interpret~tion
of value.

While Mr. Perry insists on "interest" as the central
fact or value theory, yet he also maintains that its ultimate
goal is sociality.

"Ir the rulfillment of one interest is

good, the fulfillment

two is better; and the fulrillment of

~

6

again he urges us to "cultivate
-that kind of will that is Andqualified
to bring harmony through
all interests is best."

its universal adoption".

7

In this social aspect of value,

Mr. Perry finds many modern sympathizers, among whom may be
mentioned Ale xander, Sellars, and Prall.
LaEltly, in, his treatment d

Ged as a value, Mr. Perry

tells us that to "conceive God as a person is both to confuse
the meaning of personality and to deny God the right to be
Himself", and again that God is a "norm of legitimate aspira8

tion", but not an attained fact.

For him, God is a being far

exceeding and surpassing man, yet dependent on mants moral
9

effort.

As a justification for this finite god, Mr. Perry

advances the

of evil; he prefers a limited deity rather
10
than an infinite uod connected with sin and misery.
2.

~oblem

John S. Mackenzie
As typical or those British value theorists who empha-

size the subjective character of the problem, let us take

,----"----------------------------------l~O~
John

~.

Mackenzie ot Carditt University.

Moreover l some ot

his statements l it considered separatelYI would otfer l!ttle
grounds tor criticism.

It is from the aggregate and also from

certain sufficiently definite passages that we must classify
him.

In his ultimate Values Mr. Mackenzie asserts that the
central problem of value theory is to answer the question;
what is man's chief end-;'l His reply tollows a few chapters
later, when he informs us:
"'rhe universe may be created by the desire for the Supreme
Value l rather than by the propulsion of a supreme Force;
and l in this senseI Prof. Alexander may be right in thinking ot Deity as at the end, r~her than as at the beginning of the cosmic process."
Later on in this same book he assigns the creation and the
13
enjoyment ot beauty the only ultimate value. Thus fao him
value theory shows man as creating and sustaining the deity
and the whole universe as well.

So much for his idea of God.

But what does Mr. Mackenzie say of value itselt? He
14
tells us that "values are primarily felt"1 that value is "a
15
much more fluid and adaptable expression that uood"l that
value is synonymous with good and truth l but more comprehen16
sive. In a later chapter he takes a definite stand in tavor
of the subjective interpretation of value.

For "it does not

seem possible to rest in any purely objective end without some
reference to the way in which we are affected by it ••••• we
cannot regard anything as intrinsically valuable which we do

p-'------------------------------------~l~l~
not like, or which we cannot bring ourselves to like".

17

And a

little earlier he remarks that "not only do things have"'Value,
but we value them; and thus we see that there is both a sub18
jective and an objective aspect in the ascription of value".
If we take a broad view of these last sentences, we may not
find a great deal to censure; it is only from the general spirit of his works that we can be fully sure where Mr. Mackenzie
stands.

Possibly, this situation arises from his very free

use of the term "value".

For instance, he uses it throughout

his Ultimate Values as a substitute for "good, true, end,
ideal, motive, subject, object" and like philosophical terms.
Sucg a broad view, of course, does not help to clarify his
doctrine.
B - Relational School
1.

Samuel A. Alexander
Far fewer than the subjectivists are those philosophers

who regard value as residing primarily in the relation between
subject and object.

Of these the most conspicuous advocate

is Prof. S. A. Alexander of Manchester University, who leaves
no doubt in our minds as to his opinion.
II

In every value n, he as sures us, "there are two sides, the
subject of valuation and the object of value, and the value
resides in the relation between the two, and does not exist
apart from them •••••• The combination of the subject and
the thing which is valued is a fresh reality which is implied in the attribution of value to either. Value as a

'~i'

__

------------------------------~12~

I quality' belongs to this compound and valuable things,
truths, moral goo~B' works of beauty, are valuable derivati vely from it. It
.'

In this same section, he also ascribes derivative value to the
subject, and then puzzles us by adding lstrangelyenoughl)
that this "subjective value so far as it is value implies the
20

existence of objective which is really the only value ll •

Of

the same tone seems to be an earlier passage, wherein he admits
that the object is independent of the mind, but the mind depen21
dent on it. However, the purport of these two references to
objectivity seems to be that the object exists, though not in
a valuable state, previous to the relation of value.

For else-

where Mr. Alexander holds that "the value of the object, its
coherence, is not something which is already in the things
themselves, but is born along with the act of appreciation •••
belongs to the object insofar as the valuing subject appreciates it ••••• as it is possessed by the mind and not outside
tha t rel ation ... 22
Of great importance to Mr. Alexander's theory is the
sociological character of value, which involves a relation to
the collective or standard mind;3

JrCJr

him value is only the

efficiency of a conscious agent to promote the efficiency of
24

society.

It is "the other cr distinctive feature fl that is not

merely typical, but intrinSically social.

Mr. Alexander's value theory reaches its culmination
in his concept of God, which he sets forth at length in his

13
Tolundnous Spaoe#

1!m!

emergent tip-top is
movement and in

~

deity~

partioular~

Deitz·

creator~

but a

~

whioh is "the outoome of the world's
to the extent of their value# of

the efforts of human beings".
sense not a

For him valuation at its

25

Deity is "in the striotest

creaturetr~

which must be helped and

26

sustained by the labor of man.
tinguished from

~od~

Deity~ hewever~

must be dis-

who# insofar as he exists ,and it is
27

doubtful whether he exists)# is the nisus towards deity.

At

any event this god of Alexander is the result# not the begin-

ning of man's aotivities; it is

finite~

emergent, and the pro-

28

duot of our valuing.
2.

Roy Wood Sellars
The ohief exponent of the relational theory of value

in Amerioa is Dr. Roy Wood Sellars of Miohigan.
not written much on the

subjeot~

~hough

he has

he makes his position clear

by endorsing S. A. Alexander's theory in all its fundamental
issues~9

However, he aoknowledges that there is something to

be said for John Laird's objeotive view, and adndts that it is
essentially correct at the level of praotioal
whioh Dr. Sellars seems to mean

immediate~

oognition~O But on the other hand he is

lI

peroeption~

by

as opposed to reflex

oonvince4 that reflec-

tion faces us later to distinguish between value meanings and
the terms of a oognitional type by which we think the nature
31
of the object." This distinotion of judgments so as to have a

, __.----------------------------------,.14U
special emotional class for those pertainin.g to value is characteristic of most subjective and relational value theor!sts.
Following Mr. Alexander in his attitude towards deity#
Mr. Seilars asserts that there can be no absolute eternal
standards¥2 He is also very fond of the sociological aspect
of value# assuring us that it is society which creates the
real values. 33

c -

Objective Schools

The objective school of value theorists must be divided
sharply into those who hold a doctrine more or less akin to the
Scholastic concept of value and those who# although insisting
that value resides in the object# nevertheless explain the
facts of experience in such a way as to render them impossible.
We shall first consider the most outstanding exponent of this
latter class.
1.

Wilbur M. Urban
Perhaps after Mr. Perry# Dr. Urban of Dartmouth has of

all Americans written the most on this question of value.

He

as been publishing works on the subject for more than thirty
ears.

In his earlier work# he holds for a comparatively sound

objectivity# a position which he later relinguishes.
!!£a#

l!! Nature

~ ~

In Valua-

(1909)# he describes value as resid-

ing in the object as "its funded meaning# its desirability# its

,----------------------------------~l~51
capacity under eertain conditions of calling our. desire", and
l1J

emphasizes this view by repeating it several times~4t'Cer

tainly, this opinion is fundamentally sound.

Yet even at this

time he shows the beginnings of his later dirriculties, for
be cannot agree with Meinong that value presupposes the existing object or that feeling of value follows the judgment of
ex1stence~5 However, in this same section, he seems to concede

the very pOint which he finds so inacceptable, when he admits
that "there must be the presumption of reality, for without
it there can be no attitude towards the object~6
Seven years later (1916), we find him with his doctrine
of the objectivity of value much more definitely formulated.
Here he points out that "value is a wholly unique and irreducible form of objectivity, lying between being and non-being,
but itself not a for.m of being.~7 He admits that such a for.m
of objectivity will involve a new relation, the nature of which
is not clear, but he insists that this does not matter very
much.

He argues in the following apologetic manner:

"It is, to be sure, extremely difficult to hold fast to
this conception of value as pure, as a unique for.m of objectivity, containing no element of being. It is contrary
to our own ways of thinking. AS we find reality intolerable without raiSing it to the sphere of value, so do we
find form of being. OUt of this way of thinking arise all
the confusion which furnished the starting point of our
study an~8the consideration of which will occupy us in the
sequel. "
Unfortunately, it seems that the confusion which he fears so
much never escapes h1m~9

~~--------------------------------------l-6--'
For in a later artiole o£ the same year he assures us
that value is not a determinant o£ being, nor existenoe 4 'a
necessary presupposition o£ value.

And in his reoent work

(1926), Yr. Urban is still of the same opinion about value as
a unique £orm of objeotivity and

£ind~

himsel£ £oroed to deny
40

,;p...

value the right to be an objeotive quality o£ being.

However strange and untenable his own dootrine o£ objectivity may be, we find him

strongly~pposed

to the subjec-

tive and relational Views, Which he informs us, are a con£u41
sion in terms. Like so many other modera non-Soholastios,
Mr. Urban lays great store by the anti-intelleotual or affeotive peroeption of value, whioh lies "beyond the ken o£ knowledge and soienoe"fo~ maintains that "worth experienoe in its
entirety corresponds to a larger world of reality than the
limited regions of existenoe and

truth.,,4~hOUgh

quotation might lead one to believe

this' last

that Mr. Urban is here

drawing a nioe distinotion between being as being and being
as good, the general trend of his dootrine soaroely warrants
such a favorable interpretation.

Unlike others of the moderns,

he does not develop a ooncept o£ deity, but rather ignores the
I

issue, preferring only to oonsider value in its more immediate
aspect of unique form o£ objeotivity whioh is not to be con£Used with existence.

r

17
John Laird
Not all, however, of the modern non-Scholastics are
for the most part at variance with the Aristoleli'an concept
of good and its modern equivalent value.

Especially in Great

Britain do we find some whose exposition of value theory
places the emphasis on the priority of the object.

Of these

sound objectivists John Laird stands out preeminent because
of his recent work in this field.

First of all, he goes to

great pains to point out the weakness of the subjective position, especially as it is set forth by Perr, and Prall in
their motor-affective theory, and also of the pseudo-objective
position assumed by W. M. Urban~4 Moreover, he attacks the
modern trend to emphasize the sociality of value to the exclusion of an understanding of its fundamental objective or
45

ontological nature.

But Mr. Laird's work on value theory is not merely
negative.

Indeed, he sets forth his positive doctrine in very

clear terms, assuring us that the "object of excellence" must
46

be the kernel of value theory.

Those who reject this view,

he informs us, do so either on the assumption that value is
purely subjective or on the subsumption of a quasi-objective
reality "in order to account for the obstinate and undeniable
47
appearance of objectivitJ in so many human valuations." His
own doctrine

he

calls the timological theory and maintains

~-~---------------------------------------------------1-8--'

t>(,

,

that it cannot be denied without falsifying the evidence of
experience.48
3.

Dean lAge and Canon

o.

C. Quick

We shall consider these two English clergymen mere17
to see that at Ie ast among their class a sound opinion of objectivity still seems to linger.

Mr. Quick in a brief, but

eminently satisfactory article shows that subjective states
cannot be the cause of objective existence.

Moreover, he can-

not understand any distinction between logical judgments and
judgments of value.

F~

him all value ceases the moment real-

i t7 is denied or tampered with, sinc,e reality is the onl7
foundation of all value!9
Dean Inge is also of mmilar opinion, assuring us that
any judgment which is not based on exismnce is quite "in the
air".

He accurately observes that existence itself is a value,

and indeed the most fundamental value, without which all other
50

values would be meaningless.
4.

A. P. Brogan

Returning to the United States, we find at least a few
value theorists who accept the normal objective position.

At

various times Dr. Brogan of Texas University has advanced a
OOoctrine which has man7 admirable features, of which the most
characteristic is its insistence on "betterness rt as the univer-

jP;___------------------------------------------------~1~9~1
sal value fundamental~l By this he means that in every act of
valuing there arises a triadic relation of facts wherei~ one
objective value is preferred

~

52

better to the other.

Whether

or not this position can be successfully maintained for all
acts of valuing, it certainly must be admitted that the doctrine is strongly objective in the sound sense.
Moreover, Dr.

Brogan~

in anticipation of the difficul-

ties of some adversaries, shows how even conceptual objects i. e., those whose existence has not yet been actualized 53

have nevertheless a foundation in objective fact.

He strongly

assails the subjective or "definitional" view, which he calls
a disguise for feeling, and the pseudo-objective or transcendental view of W. M. Urban, which would place value beyond the
54

realm of experience.

He also attacks the modern tendency to

distinguish between value judgments and judgments about other
things, maintaining that such a distinction is purely gratuitous.

"Moreover", he continues, "value judgments logicalll
55

presuppose judgments about existence or non-existence."

His

conclusion as to the future value theory is that the old treatment of the problem must be abandoned - i. e., modern philosophy cannot expect solid results so long as it distinguishes
between logical and value judgments and sets value over against
existence.
John Dewey of Columbia University may be included here
in connection with Dr. Brogan, chiefly because he wants to go

20

.'

on record as endorsing the value theory propounded by that
56

eminent professor from Texas.
US

Mr. Dewey himself does not offer

anything original on the subject.

His own remarks on value.

scattered throughout various philosophical journals and occasionally introduced into his larger

works~

are not profound

and are sometimes inconsistent with his adhesion to Mr. Brogan's view.

Take, for

example~

57

values to that of reality.

his opposing the realm of

This is certainly a strange remark

to come from a man holding the sound objective view; perhaps
it should be overlooked in virtue of his endorsement of
Mr. Brogan's theory.

On the other hand, Mr. Dewey repeatedly

assails the motor-affective attitude of Perry and Prall as an
"unintelligible stand", since liking or disliking, he assures
58

us, cannot constitute existence.

Summary

Many more value theorists could be discussed, especially among those who hold the subjective view; but this is not
necessary.

By this time we have considered enough represen-

tatives of each school to get a general impression of their
doctrines.

vVhe.ever it was possible, these three points were

particularly noted:

the 4afinition of value (or some equiva-

lent description), the attitude towards the value situation,
and the resulting opinion as to the nature of God.

Leaving

this non-Scholastic theory for the time, we now pass over to

~------------------------------------~2~1'
the Thomistic doctrine on value.
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CHAPTER III
THE SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF VALUE
OUr present task is to consider the Scholastic theory
of value.

This view, we shall see, has always been on the

objective side of W. M. Urban's "great divide" between subjectivism and objectivism~

Plato, Aristotle, Boeth1us,

st. Thomas and their whole tradition stand definitely against
value or the valuing subject as conferring reality, and hold
instead that reality gives the value, because reality is the
value.

The first philosopher in this tradition was the most
2

. taken up with this problem.

Aristotle, on the other hand,

treated the question only fragmentarily and did not differ essentially from his predecessor.

Nine centuries later, Boeth1u8

first advanced a fusion of both these ancient views in the
medieval doctrine of the transcendentals.

As usual, however,

it is to St. Thomas that we must turn for the finest expression
of this doctrine wherein truth, being, and good are held to be
3

strictly inseparable, except in thought.

St. Thomas' interest in the question of good and evil i. e., of value and disvalue - was not merely one of speculation, but very practical also, since certain heresies of his
own day demanded definite refutation~

Albigensianism - a sect

which flourished throughout Southern France and its neighboring
countries in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries - was

~-------------------------------------------------.
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a doctrine of non-values, a complete denial and militant rejection of all that optimism, that proper valuation of the
universe which characterizes the Catholic tradition, and which
was brought to full flower in the Scholastic philosophy of that

age~

Against this heresy, St. Thomas offers us a satisfactory
6

refUtation and an adequate positive doctrine to supplant it.
This doctrine so well formulated by the Angelic Doctor has

remained the favorite opinion with modern Scholastics, and is
most extensively employed by them in their studies of contemporary non-Scholastic philosophers.
So much for the history of the Scholastic view; let us
now direct our attention to its content.
A Posteriori Interpretation of Facts of External Reality
The Scholastic method has always been to start with
objective existence, and, if possible, to evolve a satisfactory
explanation of it.

This is to say, Scholasticism is a system

based on the facts of external reality, and committed to
posteriori inquiry.

A

It is not a preconceived mold into which

facts are poured, or a philosophy Which seeks understanding
at the expense of objective existence.
What, then, are the irreducible elements of experience,
those facts which are the most fundamental in any process of
valuing?

In that act wherein the subject acquires an object,

Whether it be an act of cognition, affection, appetition, or

r.----------------------------------~
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the natural harmonious sequence of all three, these three ir-

.'

reducible elements - Subject, object, and the relation between
them - are alwa7s present.
presents itself:

The question then immediatel7

how are these three fundamental facts ordered

among themselves'

Is the object or the subject prior'

what nature is the relation between them'

And of

The answer to the

first question gives us the SCholastic doctrine of objective
existence; and that to the second question, the Thomistic
theo~

on the relation of knowledge and valuing to its object.
Priority of Objective Being
For St. Thomas objective being is the first fact and

therefore the principle of all knowledge and appetition.

For

him the object acquired is at least logically prior to the
subject.

He says: "existent being is the proper object of
the intellect Hl; and again: "that is logically prior which
first falls under the observation of the intellect.

But the

first thing to fall under the observation of the intellect is
being, because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it
actuallyexistsJ!

In maintaining the priority of objective

being, St. Thomas is in perfect accord with the doctrine of
Aristotle who unmistakabl7 declares that "the first of created
things is

existencel~

In other words, the object must

~,

before we can know or desire it.
This objective stand of the Scholastics is fundamental

~--------------------------------------------------------2~8--~
to all sound philosophy and science and is in complete harmony
with the racts of everyday lire.

Those who question

th~ob

jectivity or knowledge must ultimately return to scepticism.
And although space does not permit us to consider the epistemological problem further, it is surficient to say that nobody
can question the priority or being without contradicting himself.
And yet, there is a certain kind or existence which
the thinking subject seems to create, which appears to be the
product or his mind rather than the object or discovery.

There

are some things that do not actually exist except in the mind,
those things which the subject fabricates ror himself without
any actual previous contact with external reality.

Such con-

ceptual objects have led not a rew or our adversaries to argue
that at least on this type of being
and endows them with reality.

the subject conrers value,

However, thinking or valuing

does not make being, but presupposes it.

Everyday experience

shows us that our thoughts and desires do not shape reality,
10
but, rather, reality shapes us. Now the conceptual being which
has caused considerable conrusion to some or our adversaries,
is none the less founded on objective reality prior to the
thought of it.

Unless the subject had pre.iously known other

objects with Characteristics capable or being assembled into
a new, compatible, though not yet actually existing, object,
then the idea would have no value.

The mere fact that the

29

conceived being does not yet actually eXist, is not of great
importance.

What matters very much is that unless

ther~'were

other beings previously known by the subject, he could never
have conceived this thing as possible.
So far it is clear that being stands first in the order
of the three irreducible elements of the valuing process:
object, subject, and the relation between them.

What, now,

is to be said of the second member - namely, the subject?
Whether there can be value without a subject, we shall see a
little later; but most assuredly without a subject value could
11
not be known.
Priority of Knowledge Over Desire
The first characteristic of the valuing subject is the
fact that its

pr~ary

action with regard to tme valued object

or the valuable is not one of affection or seeking, but of
thinking.

St. Thomas unmistakably informs us that "the intel-

lect first apprehends being, then understands it, and thirdly
12
desires it"; and again: "Knowledge naturally precedes appetite,
13
for truth is more closely attached to being than the good".
In other words, nothing can be sought before it is known.
Thought goes before the deliveration of the will and before
fulfillment; and the more an action is illumined by the light
of thought, tm more voluntary and more free it becomes.

This

Thomistic stand on the priority of knowledge over appetite is
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in direct opposition to the theories of those' very numerous
value philosophers who hold valuing to be a non-mental p~ocess,
a product of feeling rather than of intellect.

~he

Scholas-

tics cannot understand any merely blind desire of being; for
of what value is an object that is not known to be of valuef
When our adversaries make the affections cognize value, they
are merely transferring the work of the intellect to another
faculty without justifying the substitution.
Nature of Relation Between Knowing Subject
and Its Object
With the establishment of the priority of objective
being over the valuing subject, the question at once presents
itself as to what is the relation between them.
St.

~homas

In his answer

again differs from the majority of moderns, when

he teaches that the real dependence is on the part of the subject and not of the object.

He says; "The real dependence is
14
of that which is pointed at the end ft ; and e~sewhere he amplifies this same idea, observing that "the apprehended appetible
object moves, but is not moved; the appetite moves and !!
15
moved". ~uch an order of dependence and independence reveals
a relation of the mixed variety, real on the part of the subject, logical on the part of the object.

Thus dt. 'rhomas

clearly indicates that the object acquires nothing intrinsic
when the subject values it, but at the most gains a conceptual
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something.
Our discussion so far shows us the object as

ex1~ting

first in itself and then in the mind of the valuing subject.
Up to this time we have regarded the object as an indifferenc
thing.

We must now consider it not merely abstractly, but as

a cause of human action.
The most obvious fact of human life is its activity.
From the first moment of his conception until his death, the
human being is always acting.

But the activity of a living

being is not the same as that of inanimate objects.

These

inorganic units are capable only of transiet action, which
produces its effect in an exterior subject really distinct
from the agent.

Living beings, besides producing transient

effects, are capable of the higher form of immanent activity,
so-called because the change which it produces remains within
16
the living agent. Now so fundamental a fact as immanent activity, which makes itself evident in man's every action, must
have a solid explanation; and that is what we are seeking in
value theory - namely,

~ust

why do men act?

When St. Thomas insists on the priority of knowledge
over appetite, he does not mean to exclude the latter, but only
to show its natural dependence on the former.

Since man acts

as a unit in pursuing these several stages of action, the entire active process has been briefly designated as one of
appetition or conatio~7 Why the appetitive rather than the
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cognitive aspect of the process is given the preference in this

.'

key word to the value situation, will become clear as we proceed with our discussion.
question:

Our immediate task is to answer the

why does an object move a man, why does he seek

things which he does not now possess?

In other words, our

present concern is to discover the reason for human activity.
Object as the End and the Good
In the first place, if a man acts at all, he must act
for an end or objective to ae attaine~8 This is to say, he
must have an adequate reason for even beginning to exert his
dormant powers, since of themselves these potential forces
would have no reason for passing from a state of rest to one
of activity.

Hence, this objective to be attained is a true

cause, a real motive force which moves the agent to undertake
any activity.

Unless we hold that the end or objective is a

true motive force which impels the agent to act, we must at19

tribute the activity of all beings to chance.

Such an opinion,

however, cannot explain the regularity and order which is manifested in active beings.

Chance may account for an occasional

action, but constant repetition of the same activity in view
of the same objective to be attained cannot be explained except by the inflowing of a true motive force.

By tlinflowing"

is meant the fact that a real cause exerts its influence on
the effect in virtue of some power that it possesses.

What
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this speciric power or a rinal cause

is~

will become clear
~

a£ter we have discussed the nature or the object as good.
Now this

end~

this cause or motive rorce cannot move

the agent towards action in
ic and limited action.

general~

but only towards a specir-

Unless the agent is conrronted with

one determined objective or

end~

it would remain virtually

paralyzed in the race of numerous possible actions.
stance~

Far in-

there is no such thing as "just going" without having

some objective in view.

Even so-called aimless walking is a

movement in one derinite direction run not in all directions
simultaneously.

The mind simply cannot conceive or a

vague~

purposeless motion towards any number or simultaneous objectives
It is true that in a complex agent, such as
as many motions as there are faculties.

man~

there may be

But at a given moment

anyone or these raculties can be directed in only one definite
line towards one definite end or objective.
Action~

thererare~

is at least never

pointless~

always aimed at some derinite cause or action.
have called end or objective to be

attained~

but is

This cause we

or in other words

that in which the seeker finds his satisfaction, that being
wherein his desire comes rinally to rest.
We may now go further and observe more closely the
nature of this end or objective to be attained.
quite

clear~

bilitZ.

As is already

its most conspicuous characteristic is its desira-

Since in the Scholastic system desirability consti-
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tutes the essence of goo&pwe may therefore conclude that all
action is aimed at good l or at that which is in some
able.

wa~desir

Thus I the good of the object can be rightly held to be

a final cause and true motive ferce of human activity!l
The Relatively and Absolutely Good
At this point l a distinction must be made between the
relative and the absolute good.

Absolute goodness is that

goodness which a thing has in itself; it is the degree of perfection possessed by that being.

Obviously it is not this

absolute aspect of things which attracts other beings l since
they desire other things only insofar as they are serviceable
to themselves.

On this matter St. Thomas assures us that a

being "would not tend towards anything unless there were some
use in it for itself~2 YetI there is no real difficulty in
the relation of the absolute and the relative or particular
good l since what in the subject is good to the subjectl and
therefore absolute l may be also good to another subjectl and
23
therefore relative or particular.
The Interesting and the Interested
In connection with the relative good, we may well consider the question of "interest" and its part in the value
situation.

The popularity which this term enjoys with sub-

jective value theorists makes it highly important for us to

","'

--------------------------------------------------------------------~
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have clear notions about its various oorrect uses.

Putting

aside the economic uses of the term, suoh as "rate of income
on investments" or the "investments themselves", we find that
even in philosophy "interest" is employed in several widely
ranging senses.

By some psyohologists "interest" is made

equivalent to "attention", so that "being interested" means
24

"giving one's attention" to something.

Another interpretation

would make "interest" a synonym for "oonoern".

Thus we may

say that some one has an interest in something - i. e., it is
an object of conoern or a good for him.

In this sense inter-

est is like the useful good (bonum utile).

But by far the

most common philosophical use of the term is to signify the
peculiar attraction of certain objeots in virtue of associated
25
pleasurable or painful experienoes in the past. Thus we ma7
say that musio is interesting to us, beoause we find pleasure
in it.

Interest in this sense is equivalent to the pleasurable

good (bonum delectabile).
"interest"

'S being either

may be seen clea-ly from

These last two uses of the term
the useful or the pleasurable good
the following examples.

A student

may have a great interest in mathematics, not beoause he enjoys it, but beoause it will be highly servioeable in his professional oareer.

Or again, a child may take great interest

in a puzzle game, not primarily beoause of its utility to him,
but beoause it affords him a very pleasant pastime.

Generall7,

voth these interests will be found in the same action in vary-

r __---------------------------------------------------------------,
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ing degrees of intensity.
The

~portant

thing for the value philosopher

t~'bear

in mind is the distinction between the objective interest and
the subjective state whereby the interest is appreciated.

Note

well that people say that this or that object !s interesting
( - i. e. 1 useful or agreeable) to them.

They reserve this

word "interesting" for the objectl and do not apply it to their
desire of that objectl (unless they are reflectihg upon the
psychological characteristics of the act l and in such an event
their thoughts about that act would constitute a new interesting object).

Without a clearly drawn distinction between the

interesting object and the interested faculty

th~

appreciates

itl an objective theory of value is impossible.
Is modern value "the good" of st. Thomas?
Now that we have discussed the nature of the object as
an end and as a good l the question presents itself as to how
far the modern term "value tl can be identified with the medieval
concept of "the good".

According' to their answer to this query,

modern Scholastics can be grouped into two Classes:

those who

hold that value and good are synonymous l and those who for some
reason or other are hesitant in affirming the identitYI though
they are not very seriously opposed to it.

The outstanding

representatives of the first class are the European Scholastics
DeRaeymaeker l Donat, and Siwek, while tn the second class may
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be grouped all the American Scholastics who have written in
.,>
English on the problem, such as Sheen, Bandas, Ward.
DeRaeymaeker leaves no doubt in our minds as to his
stand on the question of value, for he assures us that:
"value is essentially the good, according to the Scholastic
use of the term; ,it is reducible to being; it is a property
of being, it ~ being insofar as it is perfective; in one
word it is the good." 26
Donat in his turn is equally confident tha;:
"value is the same as the good, whether this be taken as the
relative - i. e., convenient good, or as the absolute i. e., perfective good •••••• value is not something mere~,
subjective, but is the objective property of the thing."
Quite recently, Siwek has taken a similar definite
stand on the identity of value and the good.

"Value", he says,

"is the formal note of good" and the object to which this formal note of good is referred is "the object of value"?8 He also
emphasizes the objective nature of the Scholastic theory of
value by inSisting that "value is founded on being, because
being alone can serve as a necessary complement to the perfection of another being, and because being alone can constitute
a

t~ue

end".29Moreover, he tells us that beyond all relative

values, lies the absolute value, pure and simple, infinite and
necessary.30
These passages leave no room for doubt as to the attitude of the European Scholastics.

They stand definitely for

the identification of the modern term value with the ancient
and medieval transcendental of the good.

-
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Vihen, on the other hand, we turn to the American au-

.'

thors, we discover a certain hesitancy, which one might call
an almost

ex~reme

cautiousness.

For exwmple, Denis M. Galla-

gher, in his dissertation on Pringle Pattison's "Idea of God"
observes that value is not quite the

s~e

as good, but he

31'· ....

doesn't develop his argument farther.

A more complete opinion

is that of Dr. Rudolph G. Bandas, who cautions us that "the
modern temm 'value' is not to be consid~ed as synonymous with
32
'goodness'''. But here he is referring to the "bonum in se"
which is"existentially independent of any value it may have for
33

either a person or thing".

Little farther on, he adds:

"Value

has at best an affinity with the pleasurable good (bonum delec34
tabile) and the useful good (bonum utile) of the Scholastics".
And again:

"Functional value closely resembles the Thomistic

concept of a dynwmic bonum:

'Good', says St,. Thomas, 'means
35

that towards which appetition tends'".

~

Dr. Leo Ward, now of Notre Dame University, sounds the
same note in his very thorough analysis of the value theory.
He ably summarizes the entire discussion in the following paragraph:
"Our own present conclusion is that wherever there is action,
there certainly is value ••••• But unmistakably, there i~
static value in the mere existent from the beginning, because the existent is the possible a~ of action •••• Functional value adds the element of being desired •••• Such a
view of course puts value very nearly into the category of
'good' or bonum. For value, we say, is resident within
the existent always, and is functionally there when this is
object or is sought. And 'good', says St. Thomas, 'is

~------------------------------------------------~
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anything' - is the thing itself - 'insota~ as it can be
striven for and is the end of conative action' •••• This
is to make of value a dynamic kind ot good. But it~s
also static an~ean be considered from a more detached
point of view.
In these lines is the attitude of the American Thomists
accurately epitomized.

Dr. Fulton Sheen more briefly sets

forth the same ideas in his "Religion Without God", which, sinCE
it was in point of time prior to the other English criticisms,
and since these other authors did their work at the Catholic
University under Dr. Sheen, may well have been their source
of inspiration.

37

Without doubt, there is a difference of attitude in
the two schools of Scholastic thought, those of the Continent
being very certain and explicit, and those of America being
hesitant and indecisive.

Possibly, the American Scholastics

hope that by restricting the use of the term value to the functional good, and even then proceeding with caution, they may
be able to avoid the verbal contusion in which this value study
abounds.

Possibly, also, they may hope to conciliate the non-

Scholastic philosophers by not appearing to be too dogmatic.
Whatever may be the intentions of the American Scholastics,
I think that the method of the European Scholastics is the
safer one, since it is expressed in such unmistakable language
that it cannot be misinterpreted in favor of a relational or a
subjective value theory.

In reading some passages from the

American authors without careful attention to the context, one

~------------------------------------------~
40
might get. the latter misleading impression.

Our conclusion,

therefore, is that value and good, especially the

relati~e

or

particular good, are to be taken as synonymous.
Value as the Capacity of An Existent
to Be the End of Action
One might next inquire whether a more complete account
is possible.

Though the inquiry is legitimate, the answer is

not easily forthcoming, since the most obvious things are often
the hardest to define, and in some cases can only be described.
Like being itself, value is so familiar to us that any description of it must appear more involved than the thing described.
Since value is the good, then we can describe it with Aristotle
as "that which all desire" and with St. Thomas as "that which
is serviceable either to itself or to another".

Of the modern

descriptions, that by Dr. Ward is the clearest and most frequently accepted.

He says:

"Value is the capacity of an existent to be the end of action. It is the character or quality of an existent on
:~o~tt~~ :~~c~fC~~~~!~;3~r quality the existent is or
This description of value is a very good one, since it briefly
indicates the objectivity of value and at the same time emphasizes its dynamic nature.

On this point the Scholastic posi

tion differs entirely from that of the moderns, who hold that
value consists in the subject's attitude and hence the real
dependence is in the object.

~------------------------------------------------------4-1--~
The fact that the term value might, without violence
to reality, be applied to the subject also was not unknofn to
that greatest of value theorists - St. Thomas, for he clearly
explains the proper view as follows:
"Good exists in a thing so far as that thing is directed to
the appetitie, and hence the idea of goodness passes on
from the desirable thing to the desire itself~9so that a
desire is called good if its object is good."
In other words, good is applied primarily to the object and
derivatively to the subject's attitude.
that character

~

Now since value is

quality which makes an object desirable as

the end of action, we may with justice apply the term value to
the attitude or desire also, provided we keep in mind how value
1s in the object first and in a proper sense, whereas it is in
the valuing subject only derivatively, and in an aaalagous
sense.
An excellent suggestion towards solving this problem

of the identity of value and goodness is Dr. Ward's admirable
advice, that the first important thing is not a theoretical
definition of good or of value, but the correct interpretation
of reality.

The duty of the value philosopher is to discover

the data of the value situation and to order it properly.

So

long as we keep the objective facts in their proper perspective, then to what particular datum we apply the term value is
of minor importance.

Here again, the sanity of the Scholastic

system in accepting reality as it is and then only attempting

r~---------------------------------------------------,
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an explanation of it, triumphs over other procedures.

Even

some of their awn ranks have realized this superiority

ar

the

objective view and have cautioned us not to start with the unanalyzed conception of value and measure reality by it.

For
40

this is to assign value blindly a function it cannot perform.

We are now in a position to affix definite meanings to
the ordinary terms used in value philosophy.

First of all,

"value" may be taken as equivalent to the "the good", "the end
of action", "the objective to be attained".

ThUS, everything

insofar as it is good, can be said to possess value.

"Valua-

ble" should be reserved for the object before any particular
agent evaluates it.

The same object will be deemed as "valued"

after a partiQular agent seeks it.

nValuing" will serve as a

brief descriptive title for the entire active process of conation - !. e., of striving for a value or valuable object.

Note

well that before a particular agent can evaluate an object,
that object must have value.

It must possess what Donat calls

"that internal characteristic and excellence of the object
which is, as it were, an aptitude and dignity on account of
which an agent will approve of the object and desire to possess
it":l For this reason, the transition from valuable to valued
cannot be regarded as a conferring of value, but merely an
appreciation of something that already exists.

~~-------------------------------------------,
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Objectivity of Relative Value
In the preceding pages, we have discussed the good as

relative or

~rticular.

Now it is very important not to con-

fuse the relative good - i. e., the relative value - of the
Scholastic doctrine with value as being constituted only in
the relation which results when a subject values something.
For the Scholastic system, value when taken in the strict sense
and not merely analogously is always objective.

The objectivi-

ty of relative or particular value can be seen from a simple
example - say, a philosophy manual.

To a student of philoso-

phy such a manual would have great value as a source of information, but to a student for the time interested only in mathematics it would be worth merely its price of sale.

In a sense

it is true that at a given moment the philosophy manual has
varying 6egrees of value relative to the students of philosophy
and of mathematics.

But this is no argument for holding that

the student of philosophy confers the value on the manual, or
that the manual does not have value before the philosophy student became interested in it.

This fact becomes evident when

we reflect that no other book would satisfy the particular need
of the stUdent of philosophy.

The philosophy manual is a parti-

cular good beeause it fills a particular need.

If the philoso-

phy student conferred the value, he could do it on the first
available book, no matter what be its contents.

We should also

~----------------------------------------------------~
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note that the philosophy manual has real value for the stUdent
of mathematics, if he should ever become interested in ptilosophy.

Relative or particular value, therefore, is not value

in the relation, but true objective value as related or communicable to the particular needs of a particular subject.
Evil as Disvalue
In the opening paragraph of this chapter St. Thomas
is mentioned as being interested in the problem of good and
evil - i. e., of value and disvalue, and of being concerned
with the refutation of a philosophy that distorted the true
values of life.

Apart from its historical significance, the

question of evil or disvalue must be given attention in any
balanced treatment of value theory.

According to the Scholas-

tic explanation, evil is nothing positive, but consists in the
privation of gooat2 It is not the mere absence of any good,
but is the absence of a good that ought to be present.43 ThUS,
not to have blond hair is not an eVil, but not to have any hair
at all is indeed an evil.

Since evil is not something positive,

there is no such thing as a supreme evil or disvalue which
exists in opposition to the Supreme Value - Go~4 The summation of non-existents cannot make an existent.45
It is important to note that evil or disvalue results
only accidentally from the activity of the agent, since every
46

agent acts for the sake of obtaining good.

Whenever an agent

~-------------------------------------4-5~
seeks what is evil or a disvalue, he does ao because he regards
that evil as a good for himself here and now.

While sueh an

object is in reality only an apparent good or value, nevertheless it could not be sought except insofar as it is desirable
as the satisfaction of a need within the ~gent,7
Agent as Value
The last point to be considered in the Scholastic discussion of value is one which at first sight may seem to be a
serious concession to the subjective value theorists.

When

the Scholastic valuists maintain that in the very same act of
valuing an external object, the agent may be said to seek and
value himself, they certainly seem to be conceding that the
agent actually confers value on himselt18 In order to answer
this objection, we must bear in mind two facts, the first of
. which is the distinction between immediate and ultimate value~9
In the Scholastic doctrine the agent is not the 1mmediatevalue,
but only the ultimate value.

The immediate value, on the other

hand, 1s the object which satisfies the immediate need of the
agent.

By drawing a sharp line of demarcation between the im-

mediate and ultimate ends of the valuing process, the Scholastic theory can avoid much of the confusion that exists at present in the non-Scholastic treatment of the problem.
The second and more important fact to be kept in mind
is the precise meaning of the phrase "the agent values himself".

,.
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In the first plaoe, these words cannot signify that the agent

.'

confers value on himself, because he either has the value from
the outset of the process, or he hasn't it from the outset.
To say that he confers it on himself when he already has it,
is to say that he is wasting time.

To say that he confers it

on himself when he doesn't possess it, is to say that he makes
something out of nothing.

Preoisely, then, what does this ex-

pression "agent values himself" mean?

Regarded negatively, it

states the simple faot that no agent ever aims to defeat his
50

own interests.

Regarded positively, it a£firms the fact that

whenever an agent aots, he always acts for his own well-being i. e., he acts in order to preserve himself and his kind, and
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also to aoquire new perfections.

These new perfections are ac-

cidental modifications which help to fill up the void or need
that exists in every finite being.

The more an as-ent has of

these perfections, the more valuable he becomes to
to others also.

h~self

and

It is hardly necessary to remark that continued

existence is a great value to an agent.
Thus far, we have insisted on the fact that in valuing
himself the agent regards himself only as the ultimate value
and, in order to fill up the void that is natural to every
finite being, must seek immediate values outside his own limited
store.

Yet, if we reflect on the nature of immanent activity,

with which all living beings are endowed, we seem to find in52
stances of actions that run contrary to our theory. For im-
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manent activity is defined as the capacity of a living "being

."

to perfor.m actions whose entire process remains within the
agent.

Here, then, we seem to have a case where the agent

obtains nothing from the outside.

The answer is that in many

actions the living agent does not obtain anything from the outside at that particular moment, but merely works over and perfects what it received on some previous occasion.

Of itself,

immanent activity is merely the use of a capacity which God
(and the parents, indirectly) contributed to the agent at the
moment of conception.

For a time an infant might go on work-

ing over the original values conferred upon it at birth; but
unless it strove to replenish this original gift with new
values from outside, it would not continue to exist very long.
The infant, therefore, begins to employ its power of assimilating food values and sense impressions in order to supplant its
limited endowments.

Once this has been done, these values may

be worked over according to the immanent power proper to them vegetative activity for the food values, and sensation and
intellection for the impressions on the senses~3 But mnless the
values that result from later immanent activity had somehow
origina ted in the exterior w'orld, there never would be any such
activity at all.

And so, even the valuing which an agent does
54

of its own well-being is ultimately based on objective reality.
From this fact that man cannot act without seeking his

own well-being, absolute altruism is psychologically impossible.

~ ~------------------------------------------------------------------~
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There is no such thing as seeking the good of society to the
Even in the a~t of

complete exclusion of one's own interest.

seeking the Supreme Value, the agent is working for his own
perfection.

For the highest external value towards which man

can and ought to tend is the glory of God.

Yet the acquisition

of this glory to God is nothing else than man's beatitude, that
stable possession of the highest and most perfect good, that
only goal in which man's desires can come finally to rest.
We see now that in every act of conation, several
values or levels of value are involved.

If we are to establish

a sound value theory, we must keep the distinction between them
well in mind.

First comes the immediate value in the external

object - as for exwnple, the warmth of a coat on a cold day.
To a man living on the Equator this value may be only a latent
one; but it is truly present, as can be seen, if he were to
come far north in winter time.

Next comes the ultimate value -

the well-being of the agent himself.

Thirdly, if the agentfs

life is well-ordered, this act of valuing his own well-being
will coincide with the morally imperative act of seeking the
Supreme Value-God, Who in turn is the complete satisfaction of
all men's seeking.

Only the Scholastic system can fit together

all these immediate and ultimate, external and internal values
so as to explain the facts of the value situation.
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Thomistic Scale of' Values
Though the purpose of' this thesis is merely to

.'treat

the f'undamental concept of' value and not the various levels
in the ladder of' comparative values, nevertheless a brief' indication of' the order of' values as proposed by st. Thomas will
not be out of' place here.

On several occasions the Angelic

Doctor suggests a scale of' values, when he mentions three degrees of' goods:

that of' the soul, that of' the body, and that
55

of' exterior things.

In the Summa Contra

somewhat more def'inite:

Gentiles~

he becomes

56

"The order of' good:
"Now the sovereign good is man's happiness, which is the
ultimate end f'or him, and the nearer a thing approaches
this end, the higher must it be placed as a good f'or man.
liThe nearest thing to this is virtue (as Aristotle says in
the Ethics)~ and everything else that is of' use to man in
well-doing, whereby he attains happiness.
"Af'ter this comes the right disposition of' reason, and of'
the powers subject to it.
.
"And af'ter this the well-being of' the body, which is requisite f'or f'acility of' action.
"Lastly come those things that are without, which we employ
as helps to virtue" - as economic wealth~ etc.
St. Thomas is here dealing with the order of' values in their
relation to the intensity of' the corresponding disvalue or
evil.

Some men invert this order, thinking that f'inancial or

corporeal evils are greater.

In

truth~

however, the greatest

evil is the loss of' the happiness experienced by union with

r,----------------------------------~
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the Supreme Value, God.
The most interesting, as well as the most

impor~t,

value in this life is that of moral value, which is commonly
referred to as virtue~7 More particularly, moral value consists
in the conformity of one's free acts with the objective order
of creatures among themselves and in relation to their Creator.
Moral disvalue, on the other hand, consists in the failure of
a free act to be conformed with the objective order.

Even when

a man's conscience is invincibly erroneous, his act is none the
less objectively valid, according to the most universal objective norm of always doing the right thing as one sincerely
understands it.

To attempt to analyze this question of moral

value in its relation to modern philosophy would constitute a
separate treatise.

For the purposes of the present thesis, it

is sufficient to note that moral values, like all other values,
do not arise from the power of the agent to confer value on
r'eali ty, but from the inherent good which is in all being independently of any particular agent.

In other words, man does

not make the morSli order, but finds it already formed on the
objective relations of creatures among themselves and to their
Creator.
Summary
It is now time to recapitulate.
of the Scholastic doctrine

a~e

The principal features

as follows:

first, value theory

r_~--------------------------------------------5-1--'
is not merely a modern development of

Scholasticism~

but was a

.'

problem thoroughly expounded by St. Thomas in the Middle Ages.
There are three irreducible elements in the valuing process namely~

object~

subject, and the relation between them.

In the

scholastic system, the object is prior to the subject and the
relation between them shows real dependence only in the subject.

While this system insists on the priority of cognition

over desire, yet it does not thereby intend to exclude the latter, but only to show its dependence on the former.

Indeed~

the whole man is a valuing agent that is constantly seeking his
own well-being.

Though the American and European Scholastics

are not in perfect agreement as to the indentity of value and
the

good~

tical.

it is safe to conclude that value and good are iden-

Moreover, to hold that the agent values himsalf is not

to admit that he confers value on himself.

Lastly, from the

brief outline of the Thomistic scale of values, we see a possible way of making further investigations in the field of comparative values.

Thus fortified with an objective concept of

value and of the process whereby it becomes useful, interesting,
or valuable to man, we may safely proceed to examine the worth
of the opinions of the non-Scholastic exponents of value theory.

52
FOOTNOTES to CRAPTER III

!h! New

.'

~

1.

A. W. Levi, "Value in the Great Tradition If,
lasticism, IX (Jan. 1935), p26.

2.

~.,

p. 30

3.

~.,

p. 34

4.

M. C. D'Arcy, Thomas Aquinas, pp. 4, 7, 31

5.

Philip Hughes, History or

6.

St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, c. 8, 15, 122, 126,
127 - St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la, 2ae, qq. (For
quotations rrom St. Thomas, the English translation by
the Dominican Fathers is excellent.)

7.

Ibid., la, q.5, a2, corpus articuli

8.

!!2£. ill.

9.

Ibid., a. 1, corp.

Church, Vol. II, pp. 381-384

~

10.

This thesis, Chap. VII, p. 109

11.

Ibid., Chap. III, p. 45 and Chap. VI, p. 84

12.

St. Thomas, Summa Theologica,

13.

Loc. cit., corp.

14.

St. Thomas, De Veri tate, q. 21, a.l, ad 4 mn

15.

St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la, q. 80, a. 2, corp.

16.

G. B. O'Toole, The

17.

L. R. Ward, Philosophy or Value, p. 171

18.

St. Thomas, 22. Cit., 1. a, q. 44, a.4, corp.

19.

~.

20.

Ibid., q. 5, a. 1, corp.

21.

!~id.,

22.

St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 3

l~,

~ Agains~

q. 16, a4, ad 2 mn

Evolution, pp. 176-179

ill.
a. 2, corp.

~--------------------------------------------------------5-3--St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la, 2ae, q. 8, a2, ad 3 am

.'

24.

Michael Maher, Psychology, p. 355

25.

l!2£.. ill·

26.

L. De Raeymaeker, Metaphysica Generalis, I, p~ 82
"Valor ergo essentialiter est bonum, secundum acceptionem verbi scholasticrua, et ideo ad ens reduciturj est
entis proprietas, est ens in quantum-e8t perfectivum,
uno verbo bonum."

27.

J. Donat, Ontologia, p. 118
"Valor est idem ac bonum, scil. vel bonum relativum
sive conveniens vel bonum absolutum sive perfectum
•••••• Valor non tantum aliquid subjectivum, sed proprietas rei objectiva est."

28.

Paul Siwek, "La Probleme de la Valeur", Travaux du IX e
Congr~ ~nternational de Philosophie, p. 84 T:noUS-reserverons le mot •valeur , a la raison formelle du
bien; le sujet en qui se reflete cette raison du bien,
nous le nomerons tout simplement 'chose ayant une
valeur'. "

29.

Ibid., p. 90
----"La va~eur •••• se fonde sur l'etre. Car crest seulement l'etre qui peut donner un complement necessaire
de perfection a un autre etre; c'est seulement l'etre
qui peut en constituer une fin."

30.

~.,

31.

D. M. Gallagher, Pringle-Pattison's "Idea of God", p. 5.

32.

R. G. Bandas, Contemporary Philosophy
ciples, p. 252

33.

Loc.

ill·

34.

Loc.

ill·

35.

Ibid., p. 261

36.

L. R. Ward, .2.£. .ill., p 159

37.

F. J. Sheen, Religion Without Q2s!, p. 298

38.

L. R. Ward,

p. 83

.QE..

ill.,

p. 155

~

Thomistic

~

54

.

st. Thomas, Summa Theologica 6 la, q. 16, a. 1, corp •
S. Alexander, Space, Time,

41.

J. Donat, 2£. cit., p. 119
"Eo respectu enim tantum exprimitur interna rei proprietas et praestantia tamquam aptitudo et dignitas,
ut approbetur et appetatur."

42.

St. Thomas, £2.

43.

Ibid., q. 48, a. 3, corp.

44.

St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 8 & 15

45.

St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la, q. 39, a., 3, ad 2 am

46.

~.,

47.

Ibid., 2a, 2ae, q. 23, a. 7, corp.
P. Siwek, £2. £i!., p. 90

48.

L. R. Ward, 2£. cit., p. 120

49.

St. Thomas, Summa Contra

50.

Ibid., 7

51.

Ibid., 3

52.

G. B. O'Toole, 2£. cit., p. 177

53.

Cf. M. Maher, Psychology, pp. 125-153 for development of
sense perceptions
pp. 361-377 for development of
ideas

54.

While our discussion has been limited to human agents6
since they are the most important agents, the same
principles may be applied in due proportion to other
natural agents - molecule, plant 6 animal. These units
can be said to value themselves, but without being
aware of that. (Cf. Summa Theologica, la, q. 15, a.1 6
corp.) The tendencies and strivings of such agents
are called natural, in opposition to the intellectually
guided strivings of human beings.

55.

St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la. 2ai, q.2, a. 5, corp.
St. Thomas, 2a, 2ae, q. 104, a. 3, corp.

~

Deity, II, p. 314

'

40.

£!i., q. 14, a. 10, corp.

q. 105, a. 5, corp.

~entiles,

III, 3

r.------------------------------------~
55
Thomas~

56.

St.

Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 141

57.

Etienne Gilson, Moral Values and the Moral Life~ t~ans
lated by L. R. Ward, Chap. III~oral
and Disvalues".
P. Siwek, ~. cit., p. 88
fL. R. Ward, Values ~ Reality, p. 259
St. Thomas, ~. cit., III, 141

varnes

~

_

r

________________________________________________________________--,
56

CHAPTER IV
THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF CONTEMPORARY NON-SCHOLASTIC

~

VALUE THEORY
The form of the syllogism offers a good method for drawing up criticism of a position.

Applying this form along broad

lines to the non-Scholastic theories of

value~

we have for prem-

ises the two chief historical origins of non-Scholastic doctrine
-

namely~

knowledge.

the "scientific" approach and the Kantian theory of
In the present chapter we shall discuss the role of

experimental science in the development of value theory.

We

shall see that value theory borrows from science its current
interpretations of human life and the universe in general, as
well as a definite method of procedure.

In Chapter V we shall

treat the second and more important source of non-Scholastic
value philosophy - the Kanitan theory of knowledge.

This fifth

chapter will show how value theory inherits from Kantian doctrine its denial of the objectivity of truth, its disregard for
substance, and its anti-intellectual temper.
comes the conclusion.

After the premises

Accordingly, Chapter VI will consider the

conclusions at which non-Scholastic value theory has now arrived,
and.will indicate their inadequacy.

Chapter VII comes as a sort

of corollary after the main syllogism.

Of course, if the prem-

ises are inadmissable, and the conelusion consequently untenable, naturally the corollaries of non-Scholastic value theory
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cannot be philosophically sound.

And this we will

~ind

to be

the case, when in Chapter VII we apply the tenets o~ the ~on
Scholastic doctrine to the ultimate science

o~

God.

Value Theory as Tentative Working Hypothesis
In the

~irst

to value theory, that

place, science has given a definite method
o~

1

the tentative workins hypothesis.

By

"tentative working hypothesis" is understood the use of a formula because of its utility, whether it be true or not.
ton Sheen

of~ers

Dr. Ful-

us this clear description of the method:

"The formulae o~ science are not
ful and convenient. They serve
later are supplanted by new and
relative to the advance and the

true, they are merely usefor a time, and sooner or
other ~ormulae. They ar~
convenience of science."

Thus, if the electron theory proves satisfactory for experimentation, why should we be concerned to establish its absolute
certainty?

When the electron theory or any other hypotheSis

fails to explain the phenomena of experiment, only then need it
be modified or dropped entirely.
Naturally, value theo.rists who have not been able to
work out a

satis~actory

system of philosophy, would turn with

enthusiasm towards this idea of a tentative working hypothesis.
For this reason many non-Scholastic philosophers do not even
mention the fundamental problem of value at all, but concern
themselves only with immediate and secondary values.

These

philosophers ignore the problem of an objective foundation for
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their scale of values and are content with a discussion of its
present usefulness, whether it be true or not.

Yet,

thi~

prag-

matic approach to the question of value does not arise entirely
from the influence of contemporary science.

Certainly, however,

a doctrine which enjoys great popularity in the field of science, must have influence in the philosophical work of men,
such as Alexander, Perry, and Whitehead, who are also deeply
interested in science.
The Scientific Interpretation of Value
In the second place, these scientifically-minded val-

uists not only apply their outlook of the working hypothesis
to the philosophy of value, but also tend to interpret their
entire philosophy in the light of present-day "scientific" conelusions.

Value theory today is often but an echo of current

"scientific" opinion, as for instance, of evolution or spacetime.
Thus, among valuists we find R. B. Perry assuring us
that the theory of value is but a part of the greater scientific movement that has explained the physical world and is now
3

successfully annexing the whole of human life.

Moreover, his

own particular interest in biology has led him to apply the
4

principle of emergent evolution to the theory of value. S. A.
Alexander, in his Space, Time and Deity, has attempted to draw
up a complete explanation of the entire universe in terms of a
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space-time continum that is also constantly evolving.
ing to this

theory~

Accord-

.'

all nature is one continuous process o£

space and timeP These two are the elements that generate all
things~

terP

time being, as it were, the £orm, and

space~

the mat-

In this evolutionary process, wherein the quality o£ mat-

ter emerges into life and life into mind, mind itsel£ will ultimately emerge into deity, which is "out in front".

Value

theory itself is but a part of this space-time system and arises
from the amalgamation of mind with objects7 Following Profes. sor Alexander not only in his value philosophy, but also in the
scientific approach to

it~

R. W. Sellars insists that we must

turn to evolution for an anawer to the problems of ontology and
should regard the living thing as a spatio-temporal system~
This modern tendency to apply the procedure and conclusions of experimental science to philosophy may be called
"the fallacy o£ the uniform method of science" ~

OUr present

concern with it is to discover in what ways it is an unsound
basis for the philosophy of aalue.
Rejection of the Hierarchy of Sciences
The first error of the uniform method of science is its
assumption that all aCiences, experimental and

speculative~

are

of equal dignity, and its consequence failure to realize that
there exists a hierarchy of sCiences, according to their degree
of abstraction from sensible matter.

Of

course~

while one can
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hardly expect scientists Dho do not admit the existence

or

.'

any-

thing but evolving matter, space-time, er the like to recognize
the nature

or

this hierarchy

or

sCiences, nevertheless their

oversight does not alter the racts

or

experience.

As usual, we

must turn to St. Thomas for an explanation of how science progresses from the physical to the mathematical and finally to
10
the metaphysical order.
Man in his search for the truth of the inner nature of
reality first abstracts from the individual characteristics of
things and eonsiders them according to their common sensible
qualities.

This process gives him the science of physics,

which embraces not merely the limited field which is now known
by that name, but the whole of the physical sciences.

Next

abstracting from qualities, he considers matter under the aspect of quantity only, and thus constructs the science of mathematics.

Lastly he omits quantity itselr in order to consider

only being, and thereby evolves the science of metaphysics.

In

each process the matter is the same (e.ther the material world
for physics and mathematics, or the material and spiritual
worlds together for metaphysics), but the ferm in each case is
different.

In physics it is quality, in mathematics it is quan-

tity, and in metaphysics, being itself.
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Fallacy of the Uniform

~ethod

of Science

From the failure to recognize a hierarchy gmong the
sciences springs the second error of the uniform method namely, its application of the principles of a lower science
to a higher one.11 This process we see constantly applied wheneVAr the purely physical theory of space-time or the purely
biological theory of evolution is employed to explain the proelam of value.

Whereas the laws and conclusions of these theo-

ries belong entirely to the physical or mathematical orders,
inasmuch as they deal with quality or quantity, value philosophy is or should be of the metaphysical order, since it pertains to the nature of being as being.

Metaphysics, however,

cannot depend upon physics for its principles, anymore than the
part can be the explanation of the whole.

The more reasonable

expectation seems to be that the lower sciences should depend
on metaphysics for their first principles, since the principles
of metaphysics are the principles of being itself, and the matter of the lower sciences is certainly being"

if it is anything

at all~2Justly, indeed, has St. Thomas named metaphysics the
first philosophy, because from it all othBr sciences derive
their ultimate principles.
Tme insecure position of the uniform method of science
is further seen from the impossibility of physical science to
escape metaphysical implication.

The very denial of the use-
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rulness or metaphysics is in itselr a metaphysical principle,
which may be summed up in the rormula that tentative exp~riment
is the only approach to truth~3 For the modern scientist who
favors the uniform method, the inescapable subsumption is that
all reality must be interpreted pragmatically and in terms or
material being.

In order to avoid conceding that physics and

mathematics either smuggle in metaphysical principles or assume
principles or their own without proor, some value theorists as
well as scientists have suggested that by a circular way propOSitions could be made to depend upon one another and thus
prove themselves reciprocally.

However, this apparent method

or escape is only a vicious Circle, wherein the propositions
are made simultaneously to serve contradictory and, therefore,
philosophically useless roles - namely, those of premise and
14
of conclusion.
In summing up our discussion or the inrluence or contemporary science

o~

value theory, we see from the works of

Perry, Alexander, and Sellars, that it has been very great.
However, this conridence in experimental science has not been
well founded, since the pragmatic hypotheses and the empirical
conclusions of biology, physiCS, mathematics, and the other
natural sciences cannot licitly be applied to the higher metaphysical science or value.

What Perry, Alexander and Sellars

have failed to realize is that a new natural science (as, ror
example, a new physics or a new biology) is nothing more than
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a new natural science and not a new philosophy of nature.

Ac-

cording to their way of reasoning, value theory must chsfige
with each advance of natural science.
while the physical sciences may

change~

For St. Thomas,

however~

the metaphysical basis

for them remains ever the smme, since this basis arises from
the very nature of being itseli~ Experimental science is indeed an inductive process, while the general philosophy of
value must be chiefly deductive.

To regard both as belonging

to the same order will only result in confusion and ultimately
in the rejection of metaphysics.

And thus crumbles one of the

two historical foundations of contemporary non-Scholastic value
theory.

r
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FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER IV
1.

F. J. Sheen, Philosophy £! Science, pp. 3, 11-14, 16
L. J. Walker, Theories of Knowledge has a complete discussion of the application of the pragmatic method to philosophy.
a) pp. 15-18, 128-132, 154-160, 671-675
b) Chap. 17, 20, 21, 22
Notice especially:
a) p. 470 "The Paagmatism of the philosophising scientist •••••• is, in fact, but a development of the
doctrine that the definitions and laws which belong to Physical Theory are only symbolic formulae,
figured hypotheses, postulates which are useful,
but not true. And this doctrine can only be called
'pragmatic' retrospectively for it existed before
Pragmatism proper was invented."
b) p. 471 "To many scientists, anxious to solve the
mystery presented by a daily-increasing multitude
of conflicting and seemingly irreconcilable pypotheses, only two alternatives seemed to offer themselves, either Scepticism or a kind of provisional
pragmatism. Believing themselves confronted with
a choice such as this, many have adopted the latter
alternative - i. e., rather than give up truth altogether, they prefer to regard it in Physical Science as a "value".
c) p. 159 "The objection to the Experimental Theory is
not that postulation and experiment is not a fact,
but that it is not by any means the only way to
knowledge. ft

2.

F. J. Sheen, ~ ~ Intelligence, p. 71
In connection
with this matter, the whole of pages 71-73 should be
read carefully. Notice in particular:
a) p. 71 IIModern philosophy is a lyric poet of science. By the principle of lyriCism is meant that,
immediately upon the discovery of any important
theory in one SCience, modern philosophy applies
it to its own field whether it is applicable or
not."
b} p. 73 "In a general and broad way the lyricism may
be represented as follows:
I - Empirical Sc~ence
Formulae are convenient; they are not truebut useful.
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II - Philosophical Lyricism
A. Philosophical principles, God, eternal veri ties are useful. Their·'truth
is to be determined by their usefulness. Pragmatism
B. Pure thoughtEI in philosophy are pure
formulae - in science are fictions.
Man is the measure of truth.
Humanism
C. The value of the idea, as the value of
the scientific hypothesis or formula,
is determined by its instrumental or
functional efficacy. Instrumentalism"
3.

R. B. Perry, General Theory of Value, pp. 11-13

4.

~.,

5.

S. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, II, p. 67

6.

ill£.,

7.

Ibid., Chap. IX

8.

R. W. Sellars, frinciples
pp. 214-290

9,

F. J. Sheen, Religion Without

pp. 152-157

p. 47

~

Problems
~,

2!

Philosophy,

p. 224

l2! Trinitate Boeth1i, q. 5

10.

St. Thomas,

11.

~.,

12.

St. Thomas, In Metaphysicam, lib. 3, lect. 5

13.

F. J. Sheen, Philosophy of SCience, p. 52

14.

~.,

15.

St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la, q.86, a. 3, corp.

q. 5, a. 3

p. 57
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CHAPTER V
THE KANTIAN HERITAGE OF CONTEMPORARY

NON-SCHOLASTI~'

VALUE THEOBY
The sedond and more important histOTical foundation of
current value philosophy is the Kantian theory of knowledge.
To Kant value philosophy owes its original impetus as well as
its most fundamental premises~

Though this quiet, unassuming

German scholar set out to reestablish the validity of metaphysics, yet he proceeded in such a way as to make the attainment
of this goal impossible.

Therefore, when the modern value the-

orists accept the conclusions of Kantian philosophy, they are
building their

~n

doctrines upon the most treacherous of meta-

physical sands.
Horrified at the extremes to which Bume's scepticism
had reduced philosophical thought, Kant awoke from his dogmatic
slumbers, firmly resolved to restore the validity of objective
2

concepts.
lem.

But at once he was confronted with an age-old prob-

On the one hand there was the sensory evidence of parti-

cular phenomena, and on the other hand there was the equally
important intellectual evidence of universal concepts.

Since

the senses do not perceive this universal element, how is it to
be explained?

Centuries earlier, the Scholastics had worked

out a satisfactory salution of the problem, one which Kant,
however, did not consider.

Instead, he assumed without proof
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that the fundamental principles o£mathematics are a Eriori and

incontrovertible~ By applying these mathematical princi~les to
the universal concepts which he desired to save, Kant developed
a system o£ synthetic a Eriori judgments.

Since the termB of

these judgments are not built upon corresponding facts in external reality, they are purely subjective forms, into which
sensory phenomena are to be poured as into a mold.

Thus, real-

ity does not shape thought, as St. Thomas teaches; on the contrary, external facts and thought remain mutually separated so
that the

f~mer

4

are of no use in developing the latter.
Subj~ct

Creates Value

That this interpretation o£ existence has had great influence on current value theory, we need only to recall W. M.
Urban' "unique form of objectivity", which is hardly anything
else than a subject mold of thought.

Many others, too, have

carried this Kantian principle so far as to maintain that value
(i. e., the perceptive process o£ the subject) even creates
reali ty i tsel£.5
Of course, i£ the universal elements in thought are
purely subjective, then one can never know whether they have
any objects corresponding to them in the world of external £acts
This ignorance is not an outright denial of the objective basis
for thought, but is indeed a profession o£ speculative agnosticism with regard to it.

Now, if we cannot know the nature
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of objective reality, and yet we desire to use certain "facts"

.'

of existence, what else remains except to disregard the problem of metaphysics altogether and to consider only the practical value that things may have for us?

That Kant himself

arrived at this conclusion is shown fram the spirit and doctrine of his Critique of Practical Reason, wherein certain mor801 principles, the objective validity of which he dould not
theoretically demonstrate, are accepted practically because of
their indispensable value.

Thus, free will, immortality, and

God are not held as theoretically knowable, but only as practical postulates of great value.
Weakness of Kant's Speculative Philosophy
Before proceeding further into the practical aspect of
Kantian theory, it may be well to pause here for a moment in
order to indicate the weaknesses of his theoretical philosophy.
In the first place, Kant gratuitously assumed that the objectivity of universal concepts is metaphysically indemonstrable.
st. Thomas, on the other hand, has clearly worked out a system
of abstraction, whereby the universal element can be obtained
from particular sensible phenomena~

In this system the claims-

of the universal and the particular are reconciled in such a
manner as to preserve not only the evidence of the senses, but
also the dignity of the immaterial intellect.

The necessity of

abstraction arises from the peculiar nature of man, who is part-

69

ly matter and partly spirit.

Since it is the immaterial ele-

ment which cognizes universal concepts1 matter in order ~o be
known must be elevated to the level
abstraction.

o~

the spirit by means

o~

Moreover, since man obtains all his knowledge

somehow through the senses~ he must use abstraction in order
to obtain any cOncept at all

o~

purely immaterial beings.

Kant rightfully recognized the necessity of general
principles as a foundation

~or

physics.

But where he went

astray was in assuming that these principles must be accepted
a priori

~rom

mathematics.

For St. Thomas, on the other hand,

all that man needs to get started in his philosophizing is the
"habitus primorum principiorum spectabilium", by means of which
he can

a~terwards

construct the highest science of metaphysics.

This habitus is not an innate for.m, but merely the natural disposition

o~the

mind to recognize

~irst

principles (as, for in-

stance, the prinCiple of contradiction) as self-evident.
Thomas clearly tells us that while the light

o~

st.

this habitus

is from the intellect, its specific matter is from the senses;
Moreover, mathematical prinCiples are of little avail
ultimate explanation

o~

~or

the

physical phenomena, since they them-

selves are not ultimate.

Mathematical principles as such per-

tain to quantity alone, and not to being, and therefore, they
10
cannot give us the ultimate reason for things.
Another

dif~iculty

under which these synthetlC a priori

forms labor is their complete lack of contact with reality.

r
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Kantian subjectivism, by exaggerating the runction
manent raculties
factory standard

or
or

or

the im-

knowledge, deprives itselr or anysa";is11
criticism. As a result, there is no good

reason why the phenomena of experience should be poured into
one form rather than into another.

The Kantian category

or

relation, ror example, has no more right to mold substance and
accident than have the rorms

or

space and time.

When Professor

Alexander sets out to explain away substance as a space-time
continuam, he can rind a complete philosophical justirication
of his theories in the doctrines already advanced by Kant.
Practical Reason, the Prototype of Value Philosophy
Returning now to the practical aspect

or

Kantian meta-

physics, we shall see that it has been unquestionably the most
outstanding inrluence on value philosophy and really deserves
to be acclaimed as the rirst systematic subjective theory of
value.

Though Kant did not employ this term for his system,

he obtained substantially the same conclusions as are reached
today.

Through his speculative philosophy, Kant had eliminated

the very concepts which he had set out to reestablish.

But if

theoretical science could not save these concepts and yet they
seemed indispensable to human action, there must be round another way

or

restort,ng them.

to a second raculty
he called it.

or

Accordingly, Kant had resource

the soul - its "practical reason", as

7l

Now, this practical reason is not the intellect under
another name, for then the problem would have been merely a
quibble over words.

Neither could Kant achieve anything for

his metaphysics by attributing cognoscitive powers to the practical reason, since this admission would have contradicted all
the previous conclusions of his theoretic philosophy.

Hence

the perception acquired through the practical reason is not intellectual, but affective or vol1tional.

It is a blind, un-

rational seeking after the thing, the objective validity of
which can never be known, but must be postulated and
valuable.

Of course, any

It

~

as

judgments It that are formula ted about

such value postulates can never be regarded as immediately representing objective being.
To provide for this point, Kant's successors began to
evolve a distinction between judgments of existence, which, inasmuch as they deal with the inaccessible objectivity of things,
are purely conjectural and useless, and judgments of value,
which alone are serviceable to man.

Though Herbart, Lotze,

Brentano and others all contributed to the development of the
distinction,12yet it is to Ri tschl' s efforts that this idea owes
its greatest pOPularitf~ The Ritschlians sought to divonce
theology from speculation by denying the validity of all judgments in the religious sphere, except judgments of value~4 For
them, these value judgments are "conditioned by personal character and experience, unlike the theoretical judgments, in which

methods of reasoning common to all sound minds are applied to
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the data of perception apprehended by sound sense il !5 Modern
logicians who have been at pains to reconcile these existential
and value

judgments~

argue that nitschl did not intend to exag-

ger,ate the separation between reality and valuJ;6 Yet even these
defenders concede that he did not carry out his theory in practice, and that today there still prevails a definite antithesis
between the logical and the value judgmen~7
~o

appreciate the great extent that this doctrine of

the anti-intellectual perception of useful postulates has had
on the modern theory of

value~

one need only to glance through

the pages of Perry~ Alexander~ Mackenzie, urban and numerous
otherst. 8 tiere one will find value constantly referred to a8
"liking", "affective stateil, Ufeeling", "worth experience",
"satisfactorinessn~

etc.

.Ion .eerry's

becomes the "motor-affective

works~

attitude~,

for

instance~

value

ever to be interpreted

in terms of ·jinterest"~9 For Mackenzie, values exist only :~if
they are felt", and for
20

is through "sentiment".

~exander

the only approach to deity

urban devotes several chapters of his

Valuation, its Nature and Laws to establiShing the emotional
nature of the experience of value.

rie tells us that all worth

experience is feeliag and all consciBusness of value is at any
time our emotional consciousness. 21 lt'0110wlng

J:{itschl~

he accept

the distinction between existential judgments and those per22
_
taining to value. Seth ~ringle-~attison even goes so far as to
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maintain that feelings of value are as effective an instrument
23
of reason as is logical investigation. Moreover, accord!ng to
him, judgments of value are as objective in their own sphere
as is a scientific judgment on matters of fact.

24

And these are

but a few outstanding examples of the many modern non-Scholastics who have espousedthe cause of the Kantian affective, antiintellectual perception of value.

It is now time to investi-

gate whether their confidence in Kant has been justified.
Practical Reasons as Psychologically Useless
According to the traditional Scholastic doctrine, the
will is indeed a blind faculty, but not in the sense that it
has no known object~5 While the will itself is not the cognoscitive faculty, neverthelessit can receive its object from the
cognoscitive faculty or intellect, and therefore, is not blind,
26

in the same sense, as is the Kantian will.

For St. Thomas, the

act of the will follows the act of the intellect, and is not to
be regarded as being in juxtaposition with it.

In other words,

the reason for seeking always precedes the seeking itself.

For

Kant, however, since there is no objective reason for appetite,
the appetitive faculty must desire and also somehow generate
the object of its desire.

It must first induce a subjective

state and then in some way objectivize this state.

Now as we

have already seen in Chapter the third, there can never be any
action without a definite object as the end or goal of that
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action.

For without a derinite goal, the appetite would tend

.'

indirferently in all directions, ir it could tend at all.

Merely to make the action or the appetite tend back upon itself without any rererence to an object is a useless process;
ror how can an insurricient thing rind in itselr alone the
satisraction or its insurriciency?

It is quite true, however,

that the object or the appetite need not always actually exist;
it can be a conceptual object, an end to be actualized.

But

even this kind or goal is impossible to Kantian metaphysics,
since conceptual objects have real roundation in external being.
Thus the Kantian will, lacking any actual or coneeptual term
or motion other than its own subjective state, is in reality
psychologically useless and metaphysically impossible.

It sim-

ply cannot act because it has no end in view; and a will that
is not active is no will at all.

~~d

hence those modern valu-

ists who round their theories upon this doctrine of practical
utility, have in reality no reason for philosophizing at all,since they can never have any object to value, except their
own insufricient subjective states.
A very simple example will serve to demonstrate the untenable position of this practical value theory.

Ir a hungry

man can find no food that is objectively valuable as a satisfaction or his hunger, then there is no use or desiring at all,
for certainly the hungry appetite cannot by desiring satisfy
itself.

For a value philosopher to admit that the objective
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thing - food - is capable of satisfying the appetite of hunger,
would be to deny in practice what he holds in theory.

~d

furthermore, there can be no escape by insisting that the valuing subject confers value on the object, for if this were
true, there never would have arisen any appetite at all.

If

the unsatisfied subject can confer satisfaction on an object,
he can save time and effort by immediately conferring it upon
himself.
A third feature of the Kantian theory of knowledge that
is of great importance to value philosophy is its agnosticism
with regard to the objective existence of sub§tance.

Yet Kant

himself, aware of the need of a subject in which accidents
might inhere, admitted a being as such.

But inasmuch as this

being as such would be a noumenon, he logically denied to it
any objective validity.

Of course, a substance that is not

objectively valid can never be of any use as a substrate for
accidents, if these should happen to be objectively valid.

Ac-

cording to Kant, we understand the relation of substance and
accident because the mind relates them this way.

But one may

legitimately inquire as to why the mind relates substance with
accident and not with space or time.

If there is no objective

validity to the relation 06 substance and aCCident, it is certainly strange that the mind should always relate these two
forms in preference to other subjective combination.
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Value as a Quality
This Kantian attitude towards substance has produced a
double effect on the theory of value; first, its re.jection of
the objectivity of substance, and secondly, its consequent
acceptance of value as a quality.

As for the rejection of sub-

stance, we see it in Perry's idea of the soul, wherein he
naively assures us that "no one would now think of conceiving
the soul as a simple, indivisible, and incorruptible static en~7

tity'.

We see it again in Sellar's concept of the soul as a

flstream of ideas", altogether different from the medieval mind28

soul.

Mackenzie, in his turn, informs us that the notion of
29

substance is no longer in favor with metaphysicians.

And

Alexander's space-time continuum is nothing else than a strange
30

fusion of acts with their subject of inhaesion.

But if value philosophy drops substance, there is nothin
left for it, except to turn to the consideration of qualities,
and the one quality which best fits in vdth the anti-intellectual temper of modern thought is the quality of value.

Yet if

there is no external substance in which this quality of value
can inhere, value cannot be an objective quality.

For in such

a supposition, the accident of value would be an entity with an
essential aptitude for a substance that can never exist.

For

this reason, the value theorists who reject the objectivity of
substance must also sacrifice the objectivity of the quality of
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value, and conrine themselves to regarding it as a subjective
state.

.'

This latter assumption, however, is not a solution or

the problem or value, since it labors under all the usual dirficulties or a subjective position.
Swmnary
It is now time to sum up the leading effects or Kantian
theory of knowledge on current value theory.

First or

all~

Kant, by destroying the theoretical userulness or metaphysics
as a means or establishing the objective validity of
made the problem a pragmatic one.

truth~

Then by describing the prac-

tical reason or will as a blind raculty indepedent or previous
cognition or external reality, he rendered the act or valuing
psychologically useless.

Lastly, by proressing agnosticism

with regard to the objectivity or substance, he rorced value
into the category of quality; and since this quality can have
no external subject or inhaesion, it also becomes a purely subjective rorm.

In this fashion Kant completely separated the

problems of being and

o~

good.

For him good, ir it were ob-

jective at all, could not be convertible with being, as St.
Thomas hold~~

As a result, the problem of existence and the

problem or value must go along different paths, and the philosophy of value cannot be an explanation or objective experience.
And thus, the value theories which are founded on this Kantian
rejection of metaphysics (and most or them are founded on

it)~
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must start out without any philosophical basis and must be
relegated to the realms of sentiment and emotion.
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FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER V
1.

.'

It is important to note that Kant was not, strictly speaking, the first value philosopher, though he was the first
non-Scholastic to erect the theory of value into a system.
Clear, though remote, roots are found in Cartesian Immanence and in the Hobbes-Hume Interest Theory of ethical
values.
I - For Cartesian Immanence, cf:
A. Thomas Harper, 1he Metaphysics of the School,
Vol. II, p. 90. Notice in particular "the
theory of the French philosopher diverted
scientific inquiry from its previous quest of
objective truth •••• Results: Philosophy in
no long time came to be identified exclusively with ideology and psychology, till it was
finally distilled into a transcendental
logic ".
B. F. J. Sheen, Religion Without God, pp. 99-100;
also Chap. V. Descartes declared in favor of
ImmaneBce when he separated intellection from
sense experience. Thereby he exalted flthe
within" or the immanent in man. This explanation of the intellect as independent of
sense, is the first step in the long process
of ever increasing denial of the transcendent
and consequent assertion of the immanent,
which eventually developed into the agnosticism and the practical value theory of Kant.
C. L. J. Walker, Theories of Knowledge, pp. 213214; 291-293 discuss and criticize immance
in Kantian philosophy.
II - For a history and criticism of the pleasure or
interest theory of ethical values, cf:
A. Michael Cronin, Science of EthiCS, Vol. I,
Chap. X. In this theory the distinction between good and evil is not founded on the
objective order of the universe to its Creator and within itself, but is explained solelyon the basis of subjective emotions of
pleasure or interest.
B. ~. M. Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and
Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 344-345 has a brief
treatment of this theory.

2.

In order to avoid an excessive number of references the
writer here acknowledges his indebtedness for the exposi-
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tion of Kantian doctrine to the following sources.
I - R. G. Bandas, Contemporary Philosophy and Thomistic
Principles, pp. 234, 268-272 treat the Kanti!h origin of the sentimental approach to religion.
II - F. J. Sheen, God and Intelligence, pp. 9-47; 62-141
consider the non-intellectual approach to reality
in general.
F. J. Sheen, Philosophy of Science, pp. 5-11, 105107, 125-127, 154-155 discuss Kant's debt to mathematics and his influence on science.
F. J. Sheen, Religion Without God, pp. 156-195,
292-297 discuss the three Critiques, Kant's successors, and his effect on religion.
III - L. J. Walker, Theories of Knowledge is a very readable and lengthy treatment of the Kantian theory of
knowledge its subsequent history, and of Scholastic
realism.
3.

L. J. Walker,

4.

St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la, q. 84,

5.

F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 550
D. M. Edwards, "Religion as a Value Experience fl , Hibbert
Journal, April 1930, p. 494
F. C. S. Schiller, "Fact and Value", Proceedings of the
Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, 1926, p. 300

6.

St. Thomas, OPe cit., la, q. 85, a. 1 & 2
L. J. Walker, OPe cit., Chap. XIII-XV, in which the development of the universal idea from its origin in the
particular external objects is adequately discussed.

7.

St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 66

8.

St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la, q. 84, a. 7

9.

Ibid., la 2ae, q. 10, a. 1

OPe

cit., pp. 9-10, 217-222
a~

6

10.

L. J. Walker, pp. cit., p. 244

11.

St. Thomas, De Trinitate Beethii, q. 6, a. 2

12.

J. M. Baldwin,

13.

Hasting's hncyclopoedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 12, ,
p. 585

14.

J. M. Baldwin,

OPe

Ope

cit., Vol. II, p. 823

cit., Vol. II, 475
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15.

Hasting's Ope cit., Vol. 10, p. 814

16.

Ibid., Vol. 12, p. 585

17.

Ibid., Vol. 10, p. 815

18.

H. Munsterberg, "Opponents o£ Eternal Values", Psychological Bulletin, VI (1909), p. 335
M. Picard, Values Dmnediate and Contributory, p. 39
D. W. Prall, A. Study in the Theory o£ Value, p. 227
A. S. Pringle-Pattison, The Idea o£ God, p. 200

19.

For Perry and Mackenzie, c£. quotations in Chap. II

20.

S. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, II, pp. 373-401

21.

W. M. Urban, Valuation Its Nature and Laws, p. 82

22.

Ibid., p. 427

23.

A. S. Pringle-Pattison, Ope cit., p. 56

24.

~.,

25.

St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la 2ae, q. 9, a. 1

26.

Loc. cit.

27.

R. B. Perry, General Theory o£ Value, p. 143

28.

R. W. Sellars, frinciples and Problems o£ Philosophy,
pp. 298-299

29.

J. S. Mackenzie, Ultimate Values, p. 27

30.

S. Alexander, Ope cit., p. 151

31.

St. Thomas, Ope

p. 41

9~~.,

la, q. 5, a. 1
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CHAPTER VI
SOME INCONSISTENT 00 NCLUSIONS OF

.'

NON-SCHOLASTIC VALUE THEORY
Our criticism so far has been directed towards demonstrating bhe insecurity of contemporary non-Scholastic value
theory because of its heritage.

A doctrine that is lacking in

sound origins is not likely to attain correct conclusions.

If

our investigation is to be complete, we must also consider the
theory of value from another viewpoint than that of its historical basis.

While the history cannot be entirely separated

from the effects which it produces, nevertheless this chapter
will emphasize the preseht status of value theory.

This status

may well be regarded as a sort of fallacious conclusion to the
insufficient historical premises which wehave already criticized.
Value Theory, A Veritable Babel of
Philosophical Jargon
But before we enter upon the discussion of the present
status of non-Scholastic value theory, let us first consider
a more important aspect of almost all the non-SCholastic opinions - namely, their promiscuous use of terminology.

This ex-

cessively free use of terms has unfortunately resulted in an
almost hopeless confusion.

W. H. Sheldon admits that none of

the current theories are based on an ungmblguous, non-circular
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1

definition, and George Samtayana cries out in despair at the

.'

modern Babel of gigurative terms and perverse categories that
2

render cogent thinking well-nigh impossible.

In these doctrines

the term value is applied indiscriminately to almost anything,
whether it be the object, relation, subject, affective state,
or any other factor that may enter into the value experience.
Take, for instance, Perry's formula that "X is valuable equals
interest is taken in X", which may be abbreviated "valuable
equals valued".

:3

A theory which does not distinguish between

the capacity for being valued and its subsequent actualization
is certainly destined for serious misunderstanding.

Mackenzie,

too, can scarcely be expected to avoid grave inconsistencies
through an "elastic" term that covers almost every concept in
the field of philosophy.

4

Many mor'e examples of this sort of

inconsistency and exasperating vagueness could be enumerated,
perhaps the worst of which are Perry's three conflicting definitions of valuegiven in Chapter V of his General Theory of
Value. 5 However, these typical citations are sufficient for our
purpose.
Let us now concentrate our attention on the weakness of
the subjective position.

For without question the subjective

view oflalue is the most popular among the

non-Scholasti~who

do not favor a doctrine approximating that of Thomism.

Further-

more, since both the relational and the pseudo-objective views
can be reduced to the subjective pOSition, the refutation of
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that line o£ argument will be tantamount to a defeat of all our

.'

adversaries.

One feature of value experience which has made a deep
impression on subjective theorists is the ever present £act of
a subjective state.

Perry, for instance, spends

lar~;e

sections

of his General Theory of. Value in demonstrating how constant
interest is in all valuing. Unban, too, even when he is not
certain about the "validity of value, nonetheless insists on
the ever present act o£ valuing.

6

Now with these views the

Scholastic system can have no quarrel.

Certainly i£ there is

a value experience, there is also a subjective state, which is
nothing more than the subject's part in the relation between
itsel£ and its object.

The point on which Scholastics disagree

with their adversaries is that the mere presence of a subjective state is of first importance in constructing a value philosophy.

When non-Scholastic theorists argue that, since in

every value experience a subjective state is present, value itself must be subjectiv9, we retort the issue by pointing out
the equally important ubiquity of the object.

Thus, all

Perry's concern over the constancy of interest ends only in an
inconducive stalemate

th~

leaves the discussion to be settled

by means of other issues.
Even more important to the subjective school than this
emphasis on the presence of a subjective state is its attitude
that the agent confers the value on the object.

All subjecti-

85

vists are agreed on this

whether they are the moderate

point~

kind who admit the previous existence of the object or tHe more
radical sort who insist that valuing .creates reality itself.
our

problem~

ferrin~

therefore~

is to show that this subjective con-

of value on the OBject plainly contradicts the evidence

of experience.
why Agent Does Not Confer Value
~

tne

fi~st place~

one may jUBtly inquire how the val-

uing subject knows on what object he ought to confer value.
According to this

theory~

previous to the act of

object does not possess value and
attract the subject equally

or~

therefore~

rather~

valuing~

the

all objects should

no object should attract

him at all • . fhe dog who seeks a bone to chew

upon~

should find

equal satisfaction in a mouse-trap or an automobile wrench.

I:et

somehow no dog ever smuggles away an automobile wrench in order
to bury it for future reference.

Moreover~

if a man taking this

theory seriously were indifferent abeut the nature of the object
on which he conferred the value of food, someday he might unfortunately confer this value on a huge doee of arsenic.

xet

if the value comes only from the desire of the subject, there
really should not be any difficulty.
·J.'he natural conclusion which one can legitimately expect from the theory that desire confers value on the object is
the impossibility of failure.

~f

on the one hand our psychol-
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ogical states have power to modify external reality, and on the
~

other the condition of the object makes no difference to the
act of valuing, one need only to desire and immediately his
wish would be fulfilled.

Thus value would become the most per-

fect and most completely satisfying Aladdin's 19mp that could
ever be imagined.

Failure in such a supposition could arise

only from the inability of the subject to induce the froper
state of desire in himself.

Yet, sad to relate, we can point

out in a single day many desires which remain unfulfilled, simply because our subjective state was not equal to the opposition that external reality placed against it.

How many people

would be poor if riches could be had for the wishing?
Though this criticism may seem very severe, it is nevertheless a logical one.

Neither can the subjective valuist ea-

cape from it by urging that certain objects are not capable of
receiving value.

For what difference does the state of the ob-

ject make when the value comes only from the agent?

To concede

that certain objects are incapable of being valued is to admit
that in others there .is an objective capacity for that quality.
This admission would scarcely differ from the Scholastic concept of value as the capacity of an existent to be the end of
action.

ThUS, subjective value theory is either a mere misun-

derstanding due to the too freeuse of terms, or it is an unwitting confession that the Scholastic philosophy alone axplains
the data of experience.
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In the last chapter we already considered the psycho-

.'

logical futility of the subject's conferring value on the object, when he could save time and trouble by immediately conferring it on himself.

Our purpose in mentioning it again at

this point is to emphasize the argument of the preceding paragraph, and also to show that this subjective conferring of
value is a needless multiplication of entities.

The strict

idealist who holds that value creates the world itself is at
least consistent in rejecting a previous existence of reality.
But why should he bother to create appearances of objectivity
at all?
As the inquiring mind naturally seeks an answer to the
beginning of things, one may rightfully expect the subjective
value theorist to have an explanation of how the first value
originated.

According to this theory, it is man who confers

the value on the object.
conferring value?

But where did man get the faculty of

Where, indeed, did man come from at all?

Are we to believe that man created himself and then generated
the power of valuing out of his own need for it?

Strange to

relate, this is possibly the answer that Perry gives us, when
he observes that "the living organism isnot merely an organization and an individual, but it somehow acts ao as to bring this
organization and individuality into existence, or so as to main7
tain and conserve them". More likely, however, Perry does not
mean this passage to be an answer to the question of the ori-
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gin of life, but only a suggestion as to the manner of its continuance.

.'

For elsewhere he admits that, although he has pro-

posed to himself the question "Where does the world get its
8
shove and go?" he has not yet discovered a satisfactory answer.

Mackenzie for his part honestly avows that value theory seems
to have begun with pure emptiness~ and Alexander frankly concedes that quality is the great mysterylO R. W. Sellars, on the
other hand, does not understand why Mackenzie should be worried
about the origin of matter and life.

He tells us sincerely

that he "cannot - with the best desire in the world - see adequate

~rounds

for the assumption that physical systems are not
11

se1f-sufficient".

For him the fourth dimension, or in ether

words God, is a needless hypothesis.
A doctrine that professes to deal with ultimates and
yet cannot account for the value that is in its own proponents
certainly labors under a serious charge.

yet this is indeed

the sad condition of subjective value theory.

~f

man confers

value, he is the cause of all of it, including any that may be
in himself.

~s

a result, we have the great mystery of value

originating out of pure emptiness.

~cholastic

philosophy, on

the other hand, has no difficulty with the problem of the origin of the world.

It clearly demonstrates the existence of a

necessary First vause, Who is the rrimum Movens of all other
action. 121"rom this Supreme Agent value flows into all the objects of his creation~3 Moreover, God is the Source of all
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value, not merelY,because He is the 0reator ot' all things, but

.'

also because rrom Him alone comes the good which is in every
14
being. Whether man existed or not to evaluate the goodness or
objects, this goodness would still be there, since it is one
with the existence or things.

~homistic

doctrine not only

places absolute goodness in the object, but also shows how this
absoluje worth tends to communicate itselr to other things b¥
15
being ot' value to them. 'l'he value ot' an object is not merely
a bonum sibi, but is moreover a bonum alteri.
there is no great gulf between abIolute and

In this way,

good, and
16
both can be traced back to a self-sufficient First Cause.
relativ~

ubstinate Reality, the bugbear of uubjective yhilosophy
The untenability ot' the doctrine that the subject cont'ers value on the object is further seen t'rom the over-whelming
difficulty that subjective valuists find in attempting to exclude objectivity t'rom their theories.

~o

great amd 8p constant

is the appearance of objective reality in the human mind that
i\.ant himself admitted it to l:B a transcendental illusion, which
the intellect cannot hope to exclude, but which it must nevertheless endeavor to reason away:'? 'l'urning back to vhapter the
uecond, we see how Mackenzie at times virtually admits the objectivity which he generally seeks to take from value.

Alex-

ander also seems to have the same problem, and Perry openly con-
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cedes some sort of value to the object!8 Laird, on the other
hand, belabors the subjective value theorists for their

~

willing subsumption of Objective excellence, and neatly points
out the weakness of a system which somehow cannot avoid leaning
on the doctrine of its adversaries!9
by way of example, let us consider two passages from
f'erry's General 'fheorI of value in order to see how the subjec-'
tive valuists smuggle the objectivity of value back into their
theories.

On page 30, rerry tells us that he cannot find in

the object a distinct quale to which he can attach the term
value, and consequently he concludes that there is no such
thing.

In one sense,

~erry

is correct, for value is not a qual-

ity, if by quality is meant an accident.

Value inasmuch as it

is good is identified with the total entity of the object. However, let us suppose that there is no objective quale which may
be called value.

Later on page 124, we find

~erry

conceding

that value is an "object of interest" or the "special character
of an object".

'l'hen on the next page, he maintains that in

order to create a value, one need only to take interest in something.

~mmediately

after thiS, he admits that his argument is

apparently redundant, since one may say that it proves only that
objects of value are perceived whenever interest is taken in
them.

V/hereupon he goes to considerable pains to show that the

accusation against his position isnot well grounded.

i,.('he whole

point of this paragraph is to indicate the way objective value
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keeps creeping back into subjective philosophy.

According to

.'

this theory, there should be no difficulty over objective value,
and yet somehow it cannot be gotten rid of.
'l'his attitude has been accurately expressed in a brief
article by Leonard J. Russell of Birmingham, wherein at once the
method and the weakness of the subjective position are clearly
demonstrated.

Mr. ttussell tells us that ftvalues must function

a priori in the building up of experience", even though "we
have to force them on reality"; and again, that value is the
clue to the nature of the universe, in spite of facts to the
contrary. 20 Despite all his desire to force prinCiples on reality
he admits that "reality is the potterts wheel against which man
mus t hold himself if he is to be truly moulded ~l Probably no
more definite statement of the subjective cause and its helplessness in the face of external phenomena has ever been uttered
by a value theorist.

How much better it would be for Mr. Rus-

sell, if he were to stop fighting facts and the obstinate appearances of reality, and accepting the inevitable, construct
an objective theory based on the evidence of experience.
R. B. Perry, indeed, attempts to rej ec t the obj e.c ti ve
view as being a pathetic fallacy.

He says that objective value

may n<t be harmful "for prac tical or poetic purposes, but for
theoretical purposes it is fallacious"~2 His argument runs as
follows:

"to suppose that the force of desire liesin the object

of desire is precisely as misleadin0 as to suppose that the force
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of the explosion lies in the ignition, or that the force of the
2~

~

engine lies in the throttle. ff -r.f anybody ever explained the
objective position in this way,

~rofessor

justified in taking him to task.
not the ::>cholastic doctrine.

Perry is certainly

Assuredly, however, this is

Perry's term IIforce of desire" is

not altogather a happy selection, since it may refer either to
the intenSity of the subjective act of desire or to the capacity of the object to excite that desire.

When the Scholastic

view places the lIforce of desire" in the object, it is referring
to the object1s capacity to be the end of action.

Although the

object has "ferce" in the strict sense, it has desire only in a
metaphorical one.

~erryls

difficulty, therefore, may be re-

solved into a vague use of terminology, which could hardly have
arisen in the
~o

~cholastic

system.

far in this chapter our concern has been to indicate

certain general weaknesses in the subjective posi tion.
now consider some special

~oblems

v-~e

shall

of the three leading valuists

Perry, Alexander, and urban.
~nconsistencies

of the Interest Theory

Certainly the most convincing condemnation of a manls
argument is his own inability to formulate it without contradictions.

Sinee we have already belabored

~rofessor

Perry for

his three conflicting definitions of value, we shall pass on to
a consideration of the most outstanding feature of his theory -
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namely, that of interest.

According to }.Jerry, interes"t is a

.'

"State, or attitude, or act, or process, which is characteristic of living things, which is unmistakably present in the
motor-affective consciousness of man, and which shades away
thrcugh instinct and reflex to the doubtful borderland of tropism. f,24 Briefly, it is the "motor-affec ti ve life ~ of which
"value is a function".25'11hough this definition of interest may
seem to include the phenomena of vegetative and sensttive life,
~erry

later informs us that such is not his intention, since

only the diverse modes of human behavior can furnish sufficient
data for the science of valu~6 ~hus interest taken strictly is
to be interpreted in psychological rather than a biological
sense.

".1."his psychologioal stand of ::erry is quite remarkable

In view of his earlier approval of the behavioristic interpretation of life, wherein, however, he admits that he is a behaviorist without PSychophobia.27 yerry's reason for rejecting
the broader biological interpretation of interest is that with
suoh a view man may feel that life is not worth livin~8 Acoording to him, while the strictly biological interests a:z:e concerned with the preservation of the organism through its fundamental

li~

processes, civilized man on the other hand has higher

and more cultured interests which he must satisfy.

"Any picture

of life", the learned narvard professor poetically assures us,
"which represents the organism as trimming sail, stopping leaks,
and storing supplies in order to ride the sea, must fail to con-
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vey the physiognomy

o~

man.

lt is characteristic

o~

him to be

primarily concerned with the freight that he carries;

an~'to

set sail for distant parts rather than merely to keep afloat.
~t

is this creative and adventurous aspect of life for which

the narrower biological categories fail to provide. n29
Unfortunately for rerry, the very same method that he
employs in rejecting the biological interpretation of value may
be used against his own psychological view.

If the biological

interpretation is to be discarded because it may not make life
worth living, so also must the psychological interpretation be
sacrificed because it may not make civilized life worth liking.
Certainly it is of far greater value for a man to be interested
in his self-preservation than to like such products of IIcivilized" society as opium or marijuana.

~o

long as we fail to

look beyond mere liking or disliking, we can never hope to find
the key to human destiny.
Another great difficulty of this theory of interest is
that it makes the

~

oblem of value far too narrow.

terest is to be understood only in

te~

~ince

in-

of human motor-affec-

tive life, value theory must necessarily exclude the activity
of animals and plants as well as the inanimate tendencies of
brute matter.

~he

Neo-Thomistic view, however, has an explana-

tion that is broad enough to encompass all the activity of the
universe.

According to this doctrine, one inanimate object

tends towards another in much the same way as a human being
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desires the satisfaction of its appetite.

Of oourse, there is

.'

no conscious appetite in the brute matter, but only the material order and tendencies that are placed within it by a
preme Intelligence, Who wisely ordains the

~der

~u-

of the uni-

verse~O ~he thought and the will of inanimate and unintellectual nature is from without, the physical process of tending
towards its end or goal is from within, but only on account of
the extrinsic Mind.

For everything in the world, from the

gravitational attraction of two molecules on each other up to
the noblest desire of the cultured man, value remains in the
object and 4he desire or attraction for it in the subject.

In

this way ucholasticism is able to offer a consistent and complete explanation of the facts of experience.

Interest theory,

on the other hand, in order to include all grades of being,
must either materialize conscious life or merge matter into
mind.
'J:owards the cl.ose of his chief work on value, t'rofessor
Perry arrives at the remarkable conclusion that ,jaIl fully
aroused interests are of equal intensityn~l This st"atement can
be understood in two senses, one of which, however, is tautological.~his

first interpretation is that a fully aroused

interest completely

exh~usts

reference to that interest.

the capacity of the subject with
Obviously this is not the sense

intended, since the predicate of the proposition is
repetition of the subject.

a useless

Lhe second meaning is that the in-
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terest taken in one "object of desire" is always equal to thl:t

taken in others.

unfortunately, this latter interpreaatfbn does

not appear to fit the facts, since a manls fully aroused interest in something trivial, say in jade ornaments, can

sca~ce

ly equal the intenSity of his concern over self-preservation.
Another serious difficulty of perry's theory is that
interest in any object should always precede the acquisition of
it.

~et

such is often not the case in life.

J;t'or instance,

there are many things in wh:i.ch one becomes interested only after
he has acquired them.

Take the young lad who is forced to stu-

dy classical music or the high school student who is forced to
read good literature.

Only after he has acquired great value

from these objects does this kind of person become interested,
if indeed he ever does so at all.

For Perry, however, training

endured unwillingly and without at least some enthusiasm can be
of no value to the recipient •
.l.'he conflict between his subjective theory of value and
his realistic exposition of epistemology has occurred to
fessor

~ro-

himself, and by wat of answer he has called the
inference wholly gratuitous.32 ~et the very explanation of cog~erry

nition which he offers in defence can be used to refute his
theory of vaue.

"hat he says excellently is that the thing

known does not really change because it is known, that it was
knowable all the time, that knowable does not equal known.
if perry had only applied this method to value, he would not

Now
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have written the formula "X is valuable equals interest is
taken in X", nor would he have argued that interest

conf~s

a

special character on the object. 33 This desire to maintain an
objective philosophy of cognition and at the same time to hold
for a subjective theory of value is but another instance of the
difficulty that all subjectivists experience in trying to explain away the undeniable appearance of objective reality.
~ociological ~xplanation

~.rry,

of Value is Inadequate

Alexander and many others make much of the social

nature of value.

,i4'or them, the individual values must yield to

those of society. '1'0 Perry, for example, even the will of two34
thirds is sacred, and to Alexander, Sellars, as well as many
Continental philosophers society is the standard of mind.

35

Alexander and Sellars even go so far as to suggest that man
must now relinquish his hope of a future existence and learn
to be content with the mere continuance of human ideals, for
there is now to be had the higher satisfaction of futhering the
36

social development of the race.

No longer must man seek the

preservation of the individual, but that of the species.

It

is noteworthy that both Alexander and Sellars admit the fact
that somehow man must reeducate himself, since this social manner of thinking is not the natural one.

Moreover, by means of

this socialization of value, rerry would explain away his difficulties over the equal intensity of interest, for in the
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s'tandardizing of value "interest is added to interest in the

same objects and these objects derive augmented value
summation of the interests taken in them.

fr~m

the

37

in the first place, Perry's summation of subjective
interests in the external object is not easy to comprehend.
But more important are the unsatisfying conclusions that can
be reached by this agreement of wills.

According to this the-

ory, a trivial thing over which there is a more general concordance of opinion becomes of greater value simply because ot
that harmony of minds.

Over the value of candy, for instance,

there is great agreement among all classes, young and old.
tiut over the indissolubility of the marriage tie there is by
no means a unanimity of opinion, and moreover, a large section
of mankind - children - is scarcely interested in the question
at all.

~et

according to the sociality view, it would be can-

dy which is of higher value to mankind.

.i:his conclusion would

indeed be true, if there were no intrinsic values independent
of the subjective preference; but it is certainly erroneous in
the supposition that there is such objective excellence.

~im-

ilar examples could be multiplied indefinitely, the only purpose of which would be to show how far the subjective view has
strayed from the path of reality.
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Subjective Nature or the Relational Theorl

.'

At the outset or this chapter we remarked that all the
modern theories or value which do not approximate the
tic viewpoint can be reduced to subjectivism.

~ndeed,

~cholas-

there

are only two theories or value, the objective or ucholastic
and the subjective.
Laird, A.

~.

',l'he good work done in this rield by tJobn

Brogan, and others is only an approach towards the

more complete explanation already evolved by
successors.

st. Thomas and his

Now it is not very dirricult to detect the sub-

jective element in .Proressor Alexander's relational theory.
According to this doctrine, value does not exist in the object
previous to the subject's relation with it, but is born simultaneously with the act or appreciation~8 But ir there is no
value prior to the subjective state, then the subject must be
said to conrer the value.

lio say that value is only in the
subject derivatively is to conruse the issue.39 .Lhe simple ract
is that berore the act of appreciation comes into being, there
is no value.

"hether va.lue can be primarily in the relation or

not, certainly the value or a relation that depends entirely on
subjective activity is not objective.

tlence, the relational

theory as expounded by Alexander and Sellars is rttndamentally
the same as the subjective theories or ierry and Mackenzie, and
must, thererore, labor under all the basic dirficulties or
their position.
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Subjective Character of urbanks "Unique Form of Objectivity"

.'

'J.'he third principal type of non-Scholastic value theory
is the so-called objective view of W. M. Urban.

In this doc-

trine frofessor Urban wishes'expressly to oppose the subjective
and the relational views, which he condems as "the supreme in40
anity of interest in the unreal". Unfortunately, however, he
himself falls into the same error which he so severely criticizes.

For him value is "a unique form of objectivity differ-

ing from either existence or subsistence"; it is an irreducible
form lying between being and non-being. 41 With all due respect
to his desire to escape subjectivism, it is very difficult to
understand just what this "unique form of objectivity!1 may be
except a subjective act or state.

Professor Urban himself con-

cedes that at first we shall be confused by this new way of
thinking, since it is contrary to the ordinary way, and that we
shall find great difficulty in accepting the concept of objectivity without existence. 42
Now the facts of external reality give no evidence of
a middle between being and not-being1 3 Everything that!! must
be called being; that which which is not, must simply be called
"not-being".

Of course, all being is not yet actualized, some

of it still lies in potency; but inasmuch as it is even in
potency, it must be regarded as real, and therefore opposed to
nothing.

Since Urban does noc admit potential reality in his
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unique form, it must remain strictly a subjective conception.
Neither can he avoid the dilemma by making this unique ~orm a
quality, since qualities are also being secundum quid and postulate being simpliciter as a subject of inhaesion.
~rofessor

And so,

Urban's own theory of value ultimately develop into

"the supreme inanity of interest in the unreal".
Summary
While many more inconsistencies of the non-Scholastic
position can be discovered and discussed with profit, yet these
outstanding weaknesses are sufficient to establish our argument.

Subjective value theory, which begins by lay!ng its

foundations on the insecure ground of contemporary scientific
method and Kantianism, is not any more fortunate in the condition of its superstructure.

Here we find that all the diffi-

culties of the subjective Kantian basis becomes accentuated the
farther upward we proceed, until it is quite clear that such a
system cannot survive in reality.

Between the evidence of the

external world and the subjective theory of value the gulf is
ever growing wider and wider, so that

little hope for an un-

derstanding of the problem of value remains to the non-Scholastics unless they abandon their present approach.
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CHAP'l'B1{ VII

.'

VALUE AND GOD

In the three preceding chapters we have seen how non~cholastic

theories of value are insufficient both from the

viewpoint of historical premises and also from that of current
conclusions.

'.1.'0

complete our criticism we ought to apply the

principles of subjective value theory to other fields of thought
and human endeavor.

~ince

value theory is or ought to be part

of general metaphysics, its conclusions should be available as
fundamental principles for the other sciences.

if

on the other

hand, the application of these principles to other fields leads
to inacceptable consequences, then one may seriously doubt the
validity of the principles them8elves.

In the case of sub-

jective value theory, this discovery will only amount to a
third main line of refutation.
Since the purpose of this thesis is to consider the
pr~mary

concept of value and not the various grades in the

scale of values, we shall not mncern ourselves here with the
proximate standards necessary to art, economics, politics, and
. other intermediate sciences, but shall leap from the fUndamental theory to itsexplanation of the highest value - namely, God.
It is in its explanation of the place that God must hold in the
universe that the fUll consequences of subjective value theory
are brought to light.

Let us, then, briefly review the various
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opinions of the leading subjective valuists, in order to see

how completely they have revolted fI'om traditional philoS'ophical thought on the matter of a
For

~erry

~upreme

Being.

God is definitely not a person, since to make

him such would be to deny him the right to be himself~ Assuredly, this opinion places the strangest of possible interpretations on personality.
what God is.

But waiving that point, let us see just

In .ferry's theory God is "a harmony of wills"

resulting from the fact that persons live in concord.

He is

indeed a being far exceeding and surpassing man, yet dependent
on man for his existence.

He is the name of legitimate aspira-

tion, which, however, is not yet actualized.

'.rhus .Perry agrees

with Alexander that Dod is an emergent deity.

For Alexander,

God is in the strictest sense a creature, who is somehow to be
distinguished from ItDelty".2 Deity in his system is the next
step in the evolution of space-time.

In the past matter, life,

human mind were all in their turn deity; but now deity is out in
front again.

uod, on the other hand is the whole world as pos3

sessing the quality of deity.

Just as space is the body with

reference to time as the mind, so the world is the body of God
and deity is his mind.

Mackenzie and

~ellars

also accept the

finite god of space-time.4 urban, on the other hand, is noncommittal.

He does not deny the existence of a

but Simply ignores it~

~upreme

Being,

tiuch, then, are the outstanding sub-

jective theories with regard to uod.

'l'hough perhaps differing
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at times in details, they are ror the most part in agreement
~

that uod is not an Absolute Being, but a rinite becoming; that
He is not a person, nor even actual, but is strictly provisional and dependent on man.

ne is indeed a convenient

~od,

at

once emergent, pragmatic, physical, or anything else that the
will or, we should rather say, the whim or man desires.
The Modern Uod, a Kantian Creation
Bince we have already indicated the great debt that
value theory owes in other respects to Kantian metaphysics, it
will be interesting to see precisely what basis the modern
idea of

~od

has in that earlier system.

~Tom

the theoretical

philosophy or Kant arises the contemporary tendency to explain
our knowled@B or tiod as anti-intellectual and emotional.
a~titude

~h1s

is clearly demonstrated throughout the latter part or

Alexander's Space, Time,and Deitz, wherein the approach to
6

deity is regarded as primarily one or sentiment and imagination.
~'rom

the practical philosophy or Kant modern valuists derive

their pragmatic interpretation of God, for Kant himselr declares
that the ~upreme oeing is only an hypothesis and a regulative
7
norm. Those modern philosophers, such as Mackenzie~ who wish
to exclude God altogether rrom the rield or metaphysics, can
justiry their stand in the Kantian idea that God is real only
insomuch as He is use£Ul.

Thus He becomes non-existent ror

those who cannot find any value in !lim.

Again, the contempor-
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ary anthropomorphic exposition of the nature of

~od

direct result of the Kantian doctrine on the will.

is the

.'

uinc e the

human faaulty can never know any spiritual object towards which
it can aspire, it must ever remain on the strictly human level
and uod, therefore, will never be greater in dignity than man
himself.

Because of its insistence on the non-objective ap-

proach to God, Kantian philosophy is also largely responsible
for the current prevalence of agnosticism, in which anyone's
guess is as good as anyone elsels, since there would be no objective control of subjective sentiment and opinion.
',L,he same argwnents that were employed in Ohapter V to
reject the Kantian groundwork of all metaphysics are 'equally
applicable to his concept of liod and, therefore, need not be
repeated at length.

'l'he fundamental fallacy of .Kant i s whole

system is his gratuitous assumption that the muman mind is a
measure, and not a.thing measured.

~o

this view

~t.

Thomas and

all his followers stand resolutely opposed, since it inverts
9

the entire evidence of experience.
empty

~rms

For Kant the mind projects

on sense experience and is, therefore, the creator

of its own intellectual perceptions.

ucholasticism, on the

other hand, holdS that the mind is measured and informed by external reality, which owes its existence, not to menls thinking,
but to a

~upreme

Being Who is the Creator and Conservor of all

,
things.10 ,ii'or
Kant the prac tic al will confers good on

0

bj ec ts

according to their value to the subject, as, for example, on
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God, Who is needed to give permanance to moral standards.
~t. Thomas on the other hand maintains that the good whi~ the

will discovers in creatures is ultimately a reflection of the
11

Divine Goodness Who made them.

The Fallacy of Lnverted Helationa
'1'he total consequence of this Kantian groundwork and
its contemporary expression in subjective value theory is what
Dr. Fulton ~heen aptly calls "the fallacy of inverted rela12
tions". According to traditional thought the real dependence
in the relation between uod and creature is in the creature;
but in modern philosophy this order has been inverted so

th~

God becomes the dependent, the provisional time-server of man.
~hus

the earlier theocentric interpretation of religion has

yielded to a current egocentric philosophy.

'1'0

show that this

latter concept of the relation between uod and creatures is a
fallacy, one need only to apply the principle of causality and
immediately the untenability of the view becomes evident.
Modern valuists must admit that either uod or creatures, or
more definitely man, is the cause of the other.

'1'0

deny out-

right the principle of causality would be to embrace agnosticism and thereby render discussion impossible.
,!tlor this reason, subjective value theorists are committed to the position that man is the cause of uod.
is the consequence of this view?

Nowwhat

According to its premises,
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man comes first and uod, if He exists at all, follows from
man's efforts.

.'

'l'hus man becomes the creator or in a word, LTod

Himself, which is a complete inversion of the doctrine of Scholastics.

~t

will not help our adversaries to argue that uod

and creatures exist before man, and that man merely confers
value on them.

li'or if God exists before man and all other

creatures, ue has the power over them, and not they over tlim,
since He has the power first.

Few value theorists have attempt

ed to escape by postulating the previous existence of a valueless uod.

Rather they faankly admit their inability to ex-

plain the origin of things and are content with a limited god
at the end rather than at the beginning of the universe~3 'l'he
great difficulty of this doctrine is that, by failing to account for the beginning of things, it makes discussion about
their end philosophically useless.
Illogicality of the

~ragmatic

View of God

'rhe pragmatic view of God makes Him at all times variable and contingent and now and then rejects nim altogether, according to whatever value the individual may find in Him at the
moment.

Now to treat the concept of God in this way is as il-

logical as to hold that two and two equal four only now and then
if

perhaps for the convenience of my problem,

~

see fit to make

two and two equal five or seven, 1 may get an answer, but I
shall not have any guarantee that my answer is either right or
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wrong, and all the probabilities are in favor of its being
wrong.

~ince

.'

God is the Sufficient Reason for all things and

the ultimate expaanation of their

or~gin

and final destiny,

He is always necessary and invariable}.4.1.,or there never will
come a day when one does not need a sufficient reason for reality.
The illogicality of the pragmatic view of value can be
further seen from three possible attitudes that this theory
may take with regard to the nature of uod.

Either God exists

all the time, and then utterly to disregard Him now and then
because He may not be useful at the moment, is exceedingly
rash; or tie does not exist at all, and then to be concerned
about Him is in one sense hypocrisy and in any sense the height
of folly.
non-entity?

For why should one be troubled over the power of a
To say that one should act as if uod exists is as

hypocritical and as foolish as to say that one should act as if
one has one's daily bread.

'l'his last attitude may be likened

to that of a sick man who is willing to accept his poor relations in secret, but is ashamed to acknowledge them in public,
and is indeed a shabby way of smuggling uod in through the back
door after ne has been ejected through the front.

Or again,

it may mean that man must satisfy his wants with his own imagings, which is surely a fatal process.

'J:he third possibility

is that uod exists now and then, whenever and howsoever man
sees fit to make

~im.

Since we have already considered the
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weakness of this argument, it would seem that the pragmatic attitude of the value theory insofar as it concerns

~od

.'

is not

founded on logic or experience.
A great deal today is made of the affective rather than
the intellectual perception of uod.

In one respect this emo-

tional approach is due to

Pietism and in another to

~rotestant

a failure to distinguish between confused and reflex knowledge.
It is quite true that we do not immediately acquire very clear
ideas about the nature of uod.

But the mere fact that our

primitive concept of the uupreme Being is quite confused, does
not detract from its genuinely intellectual character.

As to

the emotional nature of pe:r:'ception, a serious difficulty immediately arises when it is applied to tiod.

Emotions vary

greatly in kind, frequency, and intensity - both in individuals as well as in society.

~uch

an inconstant element can neve

provide the permanence and constancy that is required for the
concept of the Sufficient Reason of all things, and must, there
fore, be abandoned as an explanation of our knowledge of God.
Attempted Sociological Escape from Egocentric heligion
'llhe subj ecti ve concept of '-Tod is indeed supremely flattering to a man in whom the will to power has grown excessive,
since it makes man the hub and center of the universe and its
fundamental cause.
apothesis of the ego.

Let somehow the human heart rebels at the
~ven

the most selfish men must at times
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.

be dissatisfied with the imperfections and sin in their nature •
'

tto make such miserable beings as men so often discover themselves to be the acme of achievement is the bitterest irony,
from which the human mind rightly revolts.

vur limited intel-

lects may not understand many things6 but even the simplest
savage cannotniil to realize that what he wants in uod is sanething higher and nobler than himself, something towards which
i

I

his will can aspire.
~t

is, perhaps, to this desire that the sociological

aspect of the highest value owes its popularity.

~he

subjec-

tive valuist, not wishing to relinquish his fundamental position, and yet seeking an escape from the narrowness of an egocentric religion, turns towards society as the solution of his
problem.

~hus

~od

is not the individual man, but rather the

ideal object of an ideal willlln which the agreement of even a
. 16
plurality of society is sacred.
While this theory may be an agreeable evasion of the
difficultY6 it is certainly nt an answer.

iI'or as Perry him-

self admits this unanimity of wills - alas. - does not now exist and will p-robably never be realized~ 7 tle explains his use
of the regretful interjection tlalas " by saying that the unamimity ought to exist, because it is so sorely needed.

However,

the same objection thaa is urged against the individual's being
God, can be applied with greater cogency to the sociological
view.

1J0ciety is nothing more than a collection of imperfect
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individuals, the summation of which cannot be better than its

separate components.

.'

.hus God as divinized society may be a

palliative to the subjectivist's conscience, but never a justification of his philosophy.
by showing in this chapter how the application of the
subjective theory of value to the notion of God and therefore
to that of religion in general leads to inacceptable consequences, we have established a third main line of argument for
its rejection.

~he

same method could be imployed in analyzing

the immediate aciences.

uowever, since the purpose of this

thesis is only to consider the fundamental philosophy of value.
and since the application of its principles to one science or, for example, that of religion - is sufficient to demonstrate
their logical outcome, it will not be necessary to consider the
other sciences in order to establish our argument.
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CHAPll'Ef{ VIII
'fllli FlJTURE OF

VALU~

.'

PHILOSOPHY

Now that we have considered the non-Scholas.tic theory of
value both from the viewpoint of its origin in empirical science
and Kantian theory of knwledge, and from that of its present
conclusions, as well as its application to the ultimate philosophy of uod, the only task remaining for us is to draw some inferences as to its future.
unfortunately, the prospect for value theory does not
at present offer much encouragement.

uubjeotive value philoso-

phy is indeed in a truly sad plight.

01' failing to account for

the data of everyday experience, it puzzles the thinker who is
seeking a satisfactory explanation of

~oximate

reality_

~y

professing ignorance as to the origin of the universe, it leaves
the question of ultimate reality a profound mystery, which is
most distressing to the human mind in its quest for truth.

by

destroying or perverting the concept of uod to such an extent
that it is no longer intelligible, it deprives men of the indispensable consolation of

rel~gion_

By making deity dependent

on the will of man, it takes away that Providence towards which
the unfortunate creature is want to turn in his hour of misery_
As a result, the successful man should tend to overwhelming
pride ad the unsuccessful man to blackest despair.

moreover,

the prospect of a future existence either disappears or is ren-

I
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dered exceedingly vague, since the reality of such a state depends on the power of the valuing subject1s will, a will Which
so often fails in the most ordinary things.

Subjective value

theory, too, by underminging those ethical sanctions whose
value is derived from the absolute justice of a
giver, leads to moral scepticism.

~hus,

~upreme

Law-

without the penalties

of restitution, capital and labor need not fear their excesses,
nor need the sinner any longer dread the oDnsequences of hi.
transgressions.

The present day unconcern and even contempt

for the marrilge bond and the duty of providing for the care of
children can find its philosophical justification in the subjective attitude of contemporary value theory.

Finally, it be-

comes evident that philosophy is no longer serviceable to the
average man for the solution of his problems, since the logical
development of the premises of the subjective theory of value
will serve only to render life meaningless.

Therefore, the

only course open to the wise, but "unphilosophical" man is to
abandon such idee speculation for the clear light of common
sense.
The non-Scholastic position is not, however, utterly
hopeless.

In the first pkce, there is a minority of no incon-

siderable merit who are strenuously attacking the doctrines of
their confreres and are themselves championing same views that
approximate Thomism.

Among these the most outstanding are

John Laird in England and A. P. Brogan in America; but happily
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they are not alone in their crusade against subjective or other-

wise untenable theories of value.

.'

In the second place, the

subjective valuists themBelves are not satisfied with their own
theories.

Quite recently, W. M. Urban admitted that the prob-

lem still remains unsolved, that the reconciliation between existence and value, for which he so ardently hoped at the conclusion of his earlier work, is not yet in view!

Perry, too,

frankly acknowledges that his theory is "adjoined on all sides
by thickets abounding in monstrous doubts and ilifficulties ft ,
and that he would fain have untangled the many complications
2
which beset his position.

Moreover, all of the, have confessed

their inability to explain the ultimate origin of things, a
question whiCh no sincere thinker can afford to leave unanswered
So long as these non-Scholastics remain free from an attitude
of utter complacency in their errors, it isnot too much to expect some improvement.
Here is where Neo-Thomism must step in and play the
part of wise and experienced guide.

Against the undertainty

and obscurities of subjective theory, the doctrine of st.
Thomas, scientifically enriched and amplified gy its modern
protagonists, stands firm and clear.

lts principles are thor-

oughly sane, permanent, and objective in their explanation of
the problems of life.

These principles are sane because they

are not founded on a priori speculation, but on the data of
common sense.

'.I.:hey are permanent and objective because they

118

are not based on an emotional evaluation of subjective states
of mind, but on a rational exposition of the activity of the
external world.

Lastly, by offering a satisfactory explanation

of the problems of existence and especially of human existence,
they

aff~

the mind a haven where it can be secure in its much

desired rest.
'1'0

subjective value theory, .:::icholastic philosophy can

render a second service of the utmost importance, by formulating a fixed termlnology for it.

If the definite language of

the SChoolmen had been applied to modern speculation, vv. H.
Sheldon would not have been able to complain that all current
definitions of value are useless, and ueorge Santayana would
not have needed to cry out in despair at the futility of philo-sophical discussion.

In opposition to the Babel of figurative

terms and personal fancies, the Scholastic system can offer an
established vocabulary that is also capable of sound and ample
expansion.
Very encouraging, too, is the fact that modern valuists
seem to be genuinely desirous of philosophival relations with
Scholastics.

Perry on his part deeply regrets the lack of con-

tact between Catholic and non-Catholic philosophy in this country, and sincerely hopes that both sides by speaking out their
differences will come to a better understanding of each other~
From across the sea Alexander in England voices the same ppinion.

Indeed, many of the modern non-Scholastics lay the fault
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pf the unpopularity of Scholastic doctrine chiefly to the attitude of its own exponents.

It is, therefore, high time that

the champions of Neo-Thomism should no longer be content to
enjoy among themselves the satisfaction of their own system,
but should also be eager to share it with others who may wish
for a better understanding of reality.

Perhaps, through a more

intimate contact in future discussions with non-Scholastics,
Neo-Thomisties can turn philosophy back from its subjective
wanderings and once more establish the supremacy of the philosophia perennia of Aristotle and St. Thomas.

In that philoso-

phy alone do we see any genuine promise for a theory of value.
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